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I Articles
Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly




How should we regulate the U.S. financial system after the financial
crisis when we face the task with a radically inadequate understanding of
what went wrong and what effect proposed regulations will likely have?
This paper explores three quite different approaches to regulating in the
face of severe uncertainty: the libertarianism of Friedrich Hayek, the
conservatism of Michael Oakeshott, and the liberalism of John Maynard
Keynes. Each man thought deeply about the problem of how uncertainty
affects human affairs, but each came to different conclusions about how
to address such uncertainty. The paper outlines the core, immensely
useful insights of each theorist. The paper then outlines the even more
useful and persuasive critiques that each launches at the other two. From
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank Prentiss Cox,
Claire Hill, Richard Painter, Paul Rubin, Dan Schwarcz, David Zaring, and participants at
sessions at the annual conferences of the Association of American Law Schools, the Law
& Society Association, the Midwestern Law & Economics Association, and the
University of Minnesota Law School for helpful comments.
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this collision of viewpoints, the paper outlines a hybrid general approach
to regulating the financial system which it (rather tongue-in-cheek) labels
"cowardly interventions." This approach accepts the basic insight of
Keynes that unregulated financial markets will be deeply unstable,
causing periodic destructive depressions. Thus, fairly strong regulation
of finance is needed. But following the insights of Hayek and Oakeshott,
I argue that new regulations should be cowardly. We should as much as
possible heed the wisdom embedded in markets and existing institutions.
We should identify as best we can the biggest problems that current
markets pose, and address those problems with new rules that are
measured, limited, market-friendly, and subject to evaluation and
pruning.
This framework supports a three-part response to the crisis. First,
the New Deal structure for regulating banks should be extended to the
shadow banking system which was at the heart of the crisis. (What is
"shadow banking"? Read the paper.) In that structure, the government
acts as a lender of last resort to forestall panics while using resolution
authority and prudential regulation to replicate much of the discipline of
an unregulated market. Second, more specific limited rules should
address glaring problems in the mortgage securitization chain. Third,
regulatory agencies should be prodded to constantly re-evaluate existing
regulation in light of new circumstances. Using this framework, this
paper gives a guarded defense of the Dodd-Frank Act. All three
elements of a proper response are there in the Act. There are major
concerns, however. Most importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act does not do
enough to address the largely unregulated shadow banking system. The
Act should also have begun the process of eliminating Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Even legislation without these weaknesses would not end
financial crises forever. However, if the many regulations implementing
the Dodd-Frank Act are largely done well, they may postpone the next
big crisis for a decade or two, as well as make the next crisis shorter and
less severe when it does occur. The Dodd-Frank Act is imperfect even
by the standards of a philosophy which emphasizes inevitable
imperfection, but on balance it does pretty well under the circumstances.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007-08, a financial crisis launched the Great Recession. Since
then, the United States has had to consider how to reform regulation of
its financial system so as to reduce the chances of an encore downturn.
We face this task with a radically inadequate understanding of what went
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wrong and of the effect proposed regulations will likely have. What are
we to do in the face of this great uncertainty?
This paper draws on the work of three of the twentieth century's
greatest thinkers on the implications of uncertainty and the limits of
reason: Friedrich Hayek, Michael Oakeshott, and John Maynard Keynes.
Each represents one of our leading political tendencies: libertarianism,
conservatism, and liberalism. These three men's theories respond quite
differently to the dilemma of our recent deficit. Hayek focuses on the
perils of central planning and argues for decentralized markets as the best
repository of what knowledge we do have. Oakeshott focuses on the
slow evolution of knowledge embodied in both the state and civil society
and argues that we should be wary of meddling too much and too quickly
with traditional institutions. Keynes focuses on private actors in
financial markets and the instability that their uncertainty creates, and
argues that aggressive state intervention is needed to stabilize the
economy and prevent long bouts of devastating unemployment.
What do these three great thinkers tell us about our response to
regulating the financial system after the crisis? Each offers key insight,
but each also offers powerful critiques of the insights of the other two
theorists. Fully following the prescriptions of any one of them is
unattractive. I argue for an intermediate approach' that incorporates both
the insights and the critiques of all three. Handling the private financial
system with what I call cowardly interventions triangulates Hayek's
libertarianism, Oakeshott's conservatism, and Keynes's liberalism. It is
a chastened form of liberal regulation that would craft a variety of new
rules to cabin the instability, which the overly laissez-faire approach of
recent decades has created. But cowardly interveners (CIers2 for short)
are wary of going too fast and too far, and as much as possible work
with, rather than against, existing markets and regulatory structures.
Clers advocate identifying the biggest problems that we currently face
and addressing those problems with limited new rules informed by best
practice and subject to constant re-evaluation. As a response to the
financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act is a plausible collection of cowardly
interventions.
Part II quickly reviews what went wrong in the financial crisis.
There is a lot to choose from. I focus on the stages of the mortgage
securitization process and the shadow banking system. Financial
innovation and deregulation created new ways to use short-term
borrowing to fund long-term positions and created subtle new
connections between many markets. When the prevailing optimism
1. That is to say, I wimp out.
2. Pronounced "sighers."
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faltered, people tried to sell those long-term positions in order to cover
their borrowing, and a negative feedback loop took hold. The resulting
bailouts, though needed in some form, left us with severe moral hazard
problems. The great and growing complexity of the financial system
makes it increasingly hard to understand, predict, and regulate.
Part III introduces the core insights of Hayek, Oakeshott, and
Keynes into how to regulate such a complex and uncertain system.
Hayek stresses the immense informational challenge involved in
coordinating the vast number of decisions that actors within an economy
must make. A free market system allows individual actors to make
decisions using their localized, tacit knowledge, and the price mechanism
coordinates the decisions of those individual actors. Central planning or
extensive regulation must fail because the planners or regulators cannot
gather and use all of that information. Oakeshott resembles Hayek in
many ways, but Oakeshott is unwilling to tear up existing structures to
move towards Hayek's vision of a free market society. Oakeshott
stresses that big moves in any direction will upset our adjustments to
current practices, risk losing the often ill-understood benefits of existing
ways, and fall prey to the law of unintended consequences. Keynes turns
our focus to problems that uncertainty creates for unregulated financial
markets. Keynes and his successors 3 show how various negative
feedback loops emanating from fragile financial markets can cause
sustained recessions or depressions. Active governmental intervention,
including financial regulation as well as fiscal and monetary policy, is
needed to keep the downturns and the booms from getting out of hand.
Part IV engages in a round-robin shooting match, using alternating
pairs of the thinkers to take aim at the third. The damage to each is great,
but we gain a greater understanding. As to Hayek's libertarianism,
Keynes asks why we should have any confidence in the ability of
markets to avoid a Second Great Depression (and then a Third, and
then .. .). For centuries, capitalist economies have been subject to
repeated serious financial crises, and riding them out is not a satisfying
or politically viable answer. Oakeshott argues that Hayek offers a
rationalist vision of his own. Why should we trust that vision given the
limits on reason Hayek himself stresses? Hayek lacks the humility of his
convictions. As for Oakeshott, both Hayek and Keynes point out that
conservatism provides a mood and an attitude towards change, but little
in the way of a specific program. In looking to our past for guidance, do
we dwell on the highly regulated environment of the fifties and sixties, or
the deregulation of the last few decades? How should we adapt to the
3. The most important of which is Hyman Minsky-I shall draw upon him almost
as much as upon Keynes himself.
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many new financial innovations that have transformed markets in short
periods of time? Oakeshott gives us little guidance. As for Keynes, both
Hayek and Oakeshott critique his reliance on the reason of regulators.
Getting financial regulation right is really hard, and the task never ends
due to constant market evolution, partly in response to past regulations.
It is a constant challenge to ascertain whether given regulations will
make the economy better rather than worse. Moreover, the continual
innovation of capitalism is one of its greatest qualities, and stringent
financial regulation threatens that dynamism.
Part V uses these insights to set forth a framework for regulating in
the face of uncertainty. Have we evolved a complex financial system
that no one really understands, a deeply unstable system if not regulated
but stagnant if regulated? In short, are we doomed? Well, in the long
run we are all dead. At the moment the short run doesn't look too hot
either. Perhaps doom can be avoided for a good long while, and its pain
reduced and shortened. And anyway, preaching doom alone would make
for overly depressing reading during a near-Depression.
Alternative Title: We Are Not Certainly Doomed: Regulating
Finance to Delay the Next Crisis.
I suggest an approach that triangulates the insights of Hayek,
Oakeshott, and Keynes. I advocate cowardly interventions by the state
into financial markets. The approach gives pride of place to Keynes (via
Hyman Minsky), insofar as I accept their basic analysis of the instability
arising from modem financial markets. Such markets are one area of the
economy where we do need strong regulation. But in regulating we must
always remain acutely aware of the limits on our ability to respond
effectively, and as much as possible heed the wisdom embedded in
markets and existing institutions. We should identify as best we can the
biggest problems that current markets pose, and address those problems
with new rules that are measured, limited, market-friendly, and subject to
evaluation and pruning-in short, cowardly. The cowardice respects the
limits on our knowledge as regulators, which Hayek and Oakeshott
rightly emphasize.
This framework supports a three-part response to the crisis. First,
the New Deal structure for regulating banks should be extended to
shadow banking. In that structure, the government acts as a lender of last
resort to forestall panics, while using resolution authority and prudential
regulations to replicate much of the discipline of an unregulated market.
4. Not content to rest with the Douglas Adams allusion of the primary title, this
essay resorts to a series of alternative possible titles that reflect the shifting degrees of its
pessimism.
5. I call the interventions cowardly as a deliberately deflating term, a constant
reminder of the inevitably inadequate nature of our responses in the face of uncertainty.
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Second, more specific limited rules should address glaring problems in
the securitization chain. Third, regulatory agencies should be prodded to
constantly re-evaluate existing regulations in light of new circumstances.
Part VI gives a guarded defense of the Dodd-Frank Act. All three
elements of a proper response are present. The bailouts proved the
government will act as a lender of last resort, while the Act extends
resolution authority and prudential regulation to at least some parts of the
shadow banking world. Sections of the Act address each of the leading
links in the securitization chain, including consumer products,
origination of mortgage-backed securities, credit ratings, and derivatives.
Many features in the Act promote constant examination of existing rules.
Nevertheless, more (and less) will need to be done. As for the more, the
Dodd-Frank Act does not do enough to address the shadow banking
system, but that is a problem for the future. Also, the Act should have
begun the process of eliminating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As for
the less, we need to watch for unintended consequences and be willing to
jettison elements that are not working.
The Dodd-Frank Act and the regulations to follow will not end
financial crises forever. But if the regulations are largely well done, they
may postpone the next big crisis and make it both shorter and less severe
when it does occur. Additionally, the Act may do so without imposing
too great of a burden on positive financial innovation and economic
growth.
Part VII briefly ponders whether there is a great enough chance of a
truly catastrophic future crisis to justify, by the precautionary principle,
much more extensive regulation than advocated in this paper. It
concludes that there is a realistic chance of such catastrophe, but since
over-regulation also would create a realistic chance of catastrophe, the
precautionary principle does not get us anywhere. For now, cowardly
interventions are the worst alternative-except for all of the others.6
II. THE CRISIS
The financial crisis, which led to the Great Recession starting in
2007, was complex. It had many important causes. Long books can be
and have been written on what went wrong.7 I only have space and time
6. Winston Churchill said, "It has been said that democracy is the worst form of
government except all the others that have been tried." 444 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
(1947) 206-07 (U.K.). This is an indispensable quote, and can be used for just about any
preferred policy alternative one cares to defend.
7. A few that I find particularly useful: VIRAL A. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING
WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE
(2010); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010);
SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
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to give a brief, skeletal overview, emphasizing the main problems and
themes that are particularly important in setting the stage for thinking
about a plausible regulatory response. Which problems one emphasizes
itself represents a choice which helps shape regulatory proposals. The
following sketch of the crisis draws upon my own experience and
understanding, economic theory, analyses of the crisis by leading
economists, the history of similar crises, and-importantly-upon the
understandings of financial systems and instability which we shall
consider in parts III and IV, namely the work of Keynes, Minsky, and
Hayek. Ultimately, the crisis reveals our financial institutions and
markets to constitute a complex and evolving system. It presents a
moving target for regulation-a target that moves in part in response to
that very regulation.
To understand the core of what happened, it helps to start by
considering bank runs.9 People give money to banks in the form of
deposits. From the bank's point of view, a deposit is a liability, which it
may have to pay off at any point when the depositor asks for her money
back. Banks take this money and use much of it to lend to businesses
and persons making purchases for long-term use (e.g., homes). Banks
set aside some of the money as reserves to pay back deposits when
demanded, but they do not set aside all of the money deposited-if they
did so, they would not be able to make loans. Indeed, banks set aside
well under half of the money as reserves. The less a bank sets aside, the
more leveraged the bank is. Greater leverage allows banks to make
greater profits.' 0
But greater leverage carries greater risk. One risk is that enough
depositors may ask for their money back that the bank does not have
enough set aside in reserve to pay them. At this point, the bank is in
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE
DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2010); RICHARD
POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO
DEPRESSION (2009); ROBERT POZEN, Too BIG TO SAVE? How To Fix THE U.S. FINANCIAL
SYSTEM (2010); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: How HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS
ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF ECONOMICS (2010); ROBERT J. SHILLER,
THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2008); ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG To FAIL: THE INSIDE
STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES (2009); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
8. And, let's be honest, expertise.
9. For a strong theoretical overview, see FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE,
UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES (2007). As we shall see, Hyman Minsky's
understanding of the instability of financial systems is also closely tied to this analysis of
bank runs and panics.
10. Leverage can increase profits for all sorts of investments, not just for banks.
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trouble. It may try to sell or cash in its assets to raise enough money to
pay the demands, but those assets are long-term loans: they are illiquid,
and hard to cash in at a moment's notice. The bank will not be able to
force many of its borrowers to repay immediately. It may try to sell its
loans to someone else, but traditionally there was not an active market
for such loans. If the bank cannot meet the demand from its depositors,
it will fail.
As long as depositors do not rush to make demand upon the bank all
at once, the bank should be OK. But things can go horribly wrong if too
many depositors demand repayment at once. This can happen for two
basic reasons. First, the bank may become troubled because it has made
many bad loans, and in the absence of adequate insurance, depositors
may fear the bank will not be able to pay them. As a result, many
depositors may rush to withdraw their money. This becomes a self-
fulfilling rush as depositors notice a run developing, and each tries to get
in ahead of the others." Second, even if a bank is healthy, a run may
develop if for any reason there are an unusually large number of
demands made. Depositors may notice this trend, and being uncertain
about the bank's health, may rush to withdraw before other depositors
12have the chance to do so. Runs often combine both elements, with
some problematic fundamentals and much uncertainty about the general
state of banks.13
Worst of all, such runs can become contagious. A run at one bank
may cause nervousness about other banks, leading depositors to start
withdrawing and thus creating self-fulfilling runs at many banks all at
once.14 Thus, shaky finances at one bank may affect the safety of other
banks. Banks do not have proper incentives to take such external effects
into account.15  If such a general panic gets started, banks will stop
making new loans and attempt to pile up reserves as high as possible so
that they can stave off a run. Cutting off loans, though, hurts businesses,
which in turn cut back on spending. Resulting layoffs, hour reductions,
and lowered wages hurt employees, who in turn cut back on spending,
and the financial crisis thus generates or deepens a recession or
11. The breakthrough formal analysis of a run based upon problematic fundamentals
is John Bryant, A Model ofReserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance, 4 J. BANKING &
FIN. 335 (1980).
12. The breakthrough formal analysis of a run not based upon problematic
fundamentals is Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECoN. 401 (1983).
13. ALLEN & GALE, supra note 9, at 96.
14. Id at 260-98.
15. Economists call this an externality.
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depression in the real economy.16 The slowdown in the real economy
then feeds back into the financial system, as distressed consumers and
businesses default on loans, worsening bank balance sheets.
Market economies have been subject to banking panics for hundreds
17of years. In the U.S., the Great Depression was the mother of all
financial crises, but the panics of 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 were also
no picnics. These financial struggles are typically tied to serious
recessions in the real economy, may last for years, and may lead to
dramatic increases in government debt. The current crisis follows the
traditional playbook quite closely.18 Indeed, the title of Reinhardt and
Rogoffs This Time It's Different emphasizes the core underlying
dynamic that we have observed over and over again.
But while each depression appears the same from afar, each
depression has its own idiosyncrasies when viewed under close
scrutiny.1 9 And those differences matter for how regulations should look
in response. Although traditional bank runs were a part of the latest
crisis, they were not at its core. Instead, this crisis saw a run on the
shadow banking system. To understand what this means and how it
happened, one must consider the steps of the modern mortgage
securitization process.
When banks today lend to persons who are buying a house, they
often do not keep that mortgage on their own books. Instead, banks may
securitize the mortgage. Banks typically do not originate the mortgage
with customers with whom they are familiar. Rather, mortgage brokers
identify borrowers, and direct those borrowers to banks or other financial
entities.20 Those entities use computerized algorithms rather than
21knowledge arising from a personal relationship to approve the loans.
16. The real economy is the non-financial part of the economy, where people make
things and provide other services.
17. The two best general histories are CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z.
ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (5th ed. 2005)
and CARMEN REINHARDT & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IT'S DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
18. REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 17, at 199-201.
19. Reinhardt & Rogoff reproduce an ad that describes the Mississippi bubble of
1719, which says, "History sometimes repeats itself-but not invariably." The ad then
says that bubbles should no longer happen because investors have more ways to
determine extensive facts about companies. The ad is dated September 14, 1929. The
irony, the irony. Id. at 16. But note: the ad did point to a very real difference between
1720 and 1929. Markets were very different, with many more informational
intermediaries in 1929. The difference matters a lot in considering what regulation
should have looked like in 1720 and 1929.
20. Which, importantly, need not be regulated as banks. They are a part of the
shadow banking system.
21. For a critique of these algorithms from a Hayekian perspective, see AMAR
BHIDE, A CALL FOR JUDGMENT: SENSIBLE FINANCE FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY (2010).
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Hundreds of loans are then pooled together by a financial company. The
company may be the one making the loan or another company altogether.
The cash flows from those loans are then sliced up into new cash flows
evidenced by bonds that are issued to market investors-so called
mortgage-backed securities (MBS).22
The cash flows are structured to give investors the risk
characteristics they desire. The most senior bonds have first dibs at the
cash, which flows in during a given period, while losses are absorbed
first by junior bonds. With this structure, even if many of the underlying
loans have a serious chance of default, senior bonds should be quite safe,
as they will go unpaid only if a large fraction of the underlying
mortgages go into default all at once, which was assumed to be
unlikely. 23 Credit rating agencies are hired by the issuers of the MBS
bonds to rate the different bonds (or tranches) based on the projected
likelihood of default. As the bonds became increasingly complicated,
this rating process became harder. The agencies developed complex
mathematical models, based upon state-of-the-art financial theory, for
valuing the bonds. To further shift risk, issuers or buyers often arranged
for third parties to insure bonds against the risk of default. This
insurance often took the form of a credit default swap (CDS).
The end of the line comes with the buyers of these MBS (or, more
generally, ABS) bonds. Many entities were buyers in these markets,
including private equity funds or special investment vehicles (SIV) set up
by large financial companies (some banks, some not). These entities
raised money in a variety of ways. Some were equity investments, in
which investors had the right to withdraw funds on quick notice. Many
were financed with commercial paper, short-term loans which had to be
rolled over regularly (i.e., new paper issued to pay off the old paper).
ABS bonds were also widely used in the repo market as financial
companies made short-term loans to each other with the bonds as
24assets. These financing vehicles are a key part of this shadow banking
world. They look a lot like banks-they finance long-term illiquid assets
(the ABS bonds) with short-term debt. As we shall see, they were also
subject to panics similar to bank runs.
In the crisis, things went wrong at every link in the securitization
chain. Sub-prime mortgages to borrowers with poor credit became an
increasingly large part of the mortgage market. To some extent this
But personalized knowledge has its own drawbacks-for instance, it leaves more room
for racial and other forms of discrimination.
22. More generally, bonds can be issued based on many sorts of cash flows. The
more general term is asset-backed securities (ABS).
23. Oops.
24. GORTON, supra note 7, at 27.
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started as a social good, making house ownership possible for a wider
group of people. Some innovations in the structure of mortgages were
useful to make such lending viable.25 But many sub-prime mortgages
were structured in ways that created huge risks for borrowers, and those
borrowers often were vulnerable, unsophisticated persons who often did
not understand the risks. When many of these borrowers were unable to
pay, defaults on subprime mortgages rose sharply.
Why were lenders willing to make loans that carried such a high
risk of default? One reason is that high rewards helped compensate for
the high risks. But it is probably also the case that interest rates were not
high enough to adequately justify the high risks for at least the worst of
the subprime mortgages. Furthermore, securitization creates an incentive
problem. Neither the mortgage brokers nor the financial companies that
provided the funds actually retain the risks of mortgages that are
securitized-that risk gets passed on to the MBS investors. The
originators therefore do not have a direct interest in maintaining
underwriting standards for issuing mortgages. It appears that securitized
mortgages defaulted at higher rates than non-securitized mortgages. 26
The incentive problem exists only if the MBS investors do not
detect the drop in standards and in response pay less for bonds carrying
higher risk as a result of the lowered standards. One way of addressing
that risk is to construct the MBS bonds in a way that gives more cushion
for senior, highly-rated bonds. That may have happened, but apparently
not enough-too many investors paid too much for MBS bonds given
their risk. But why didn't these investors properly take that risk into
account? After all, it doesn't take an economics Ph.D. to figure out there
is a problem, and anyway, many of the investors did have an economics
Ph.D. Why did MBS investors exercise such poor judgment?
That's one of the key puzzles of this crisis. There are a variety of
answers, and although each tells a part of the story, there is much debate
over their relative importance. Leading elements include:
Corporate governance and compensation problems. Financial
companies may have. taken on too much risk because equity-
based compensation and bonuses rewarded short-term risk-
taking. At the level of CEOs, one important study calls this into
25. Id. at 74-82.
26. For a review of relevant studies, see Christopher M. James, Mortgage-Backed
Securities: How Important is "Skin in the Game?, FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. LETTER 37
(Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/
2010/el2010-37.html.
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question,2 7 but debate on this point continues.28 The bigger
problem may have been at the trader level, although one must
then ask why the CEOs and CFOs allowed a structure that
created too much risk if they themselves were adequately
motivated to monitor risk.29 One possibility is that the CEOs
simply did not realize what was going on in their trading
departments-MBS securities did have a good track record at
the time.
* Bailout moral hazard. If market participants believed the
government would bail them out if things got bad, that would
also help explain the under-pricing of risk.30 Indeed, such a
belief turns out to have been quite justified and clearly explains
why government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac had lower capital costs. It is less clear whether
markets players realized how pervasive the implied government
guarantee really was.31 But if they did not realize then, they
certainly do now-that is one of the great problems for the
future.
* Credit rating agency malfeasance. The credit rating agencies
appear to have been too liberal in their ratings. Many point to
improper incentives created by the issuer-pays model. 32  The
MBS bond issuers pay the agencies to rate the bonds, so the
27. Riidiger Fahlenbrach & Rene Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis,
99 J. FIN. ECON. 11 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1439859.
28. Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk
Taking (Dec. 2009) (working paper), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-
hhong/heroes-decO9.pdf.
29. Many argue that compensation, at both the executive and the trader level, played
a major role in causing excessive risk-taking, including RoUBINI & MIHM, supra note 7,
at 68-69; STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 151-55. Others claim that compensation was not a
major part of the problem, including Steve Bainbridge. Steven M. Bainbridge, Dodd-
Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance, Round II, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1779, 1808-
10 (2011); see also Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 27.
30. Many point to this moral hazard problem. See e.g., RAJAN, supra note 7, at 18,
131; RouBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 70-72.
31. There is evidence, though, that the biggest banks do have a lower cost of capital,
possibly reflecting a belief that they will get bailed out of trouble. Dean Baker & Travis
McArthur, The Value of the "Too Big To Fail" Big Bank Subsidy, CENTER FOR
EcoNoMIC POLICY AND RESEARCH (Sept. 2009), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/
publications/reports/too-big-to-fail-subsidy/.
32. RouBINI & MiHm, supra note 7, at 196; Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 619, 623-24 (1999).
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agencies have strong reason to make the issuer happy by rating
the bonds highly.
* Herd behavior. As money managers are often measured by
their performance relative to their competitors, it may make
sense to follow their competitor's strategies, even if that creates
a risk of serious losses should that strategy go wrong. Should
the strategy fail, everyone will be in the same boat and
individual managers will get little blame.3 3
* Optimism. As we shall see Minsky emphasizing,3 4 as booms
continue, investors forget downturns and come to believe the
good times will last forever: This time it's different. To
anyone who paid any attention to the credit rating agency
models or the internal models of financial companies, the
assumption that national housing prices could not significantly
decline should have been obviously suspect. Yet few people
chose to question the boom and act on those questions.3 5  I
believe that this is the most important reason for the crisis, and
this is problematic for the future because it is also the element
that has least to do with poor institutional design and is most
tied to intractable elements of human psychology.
* The above factors interacted with each other perniciously.
Rajan writes persuasively of how the system encouraged
financial companies to take on tail risk-that is, to achieve high
returns that had a small-but as it turned out, non-zero-chance
of large future losses. Compensation favored a short time
horizon, with traders not punished for big losses that occurred at
a later date. Unduly high credit ratings made the risk appear
smaller than it actually was, and if things did go wrong, they
would go wrong for many players at once, leaving fewer
individuals identifiably responsible. And behind all this was
33. RAJAN, supra note 7, at 139; Claire A. Hill, Why Didn't Subprime Investors
Demand (Much) More ofa Lemons Premium, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (2011);
Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and Why It Matters, 4
ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 323, 345 (2010).
34. Infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
35. Some did, and some of them became very, very rich. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS,
THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). But market arbitrage is risky
with lots of costs involved, and so typically not enough of it occurs to bring prices into
line. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 46-47
(1997).
132011]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
always the possibility (and in the end the reality) of government
bailouts. 36
The CDS derivatives used to redistribute risks on MBS bonds also
caused problems. A few big players-above all AIG-dominated this
market, and issued insurance at extremely low prices. As defaults started
to occur in large numbers, AIG found itself unable to honor its
obligations and was taken over by the government. And here
"counterparty risk" entered the general public's lexicon. Many major
companies had contracts with AIG and stood to lose vast sums of money
when AIG could not pay. Given a lack of transparency in this market, it
was not well known who was exposed to counterparty risk, and this
helped fuel suspicion and panic as distrust spread.
Worst of all was the financing of MBS bond purchases at the far
end of the securitization chain. As defaults started to occur in
unexpectedly large numbers, bonds became riskier and less valuable.
Because of their complexity, it was hard to determine where these
heightened costs would fall. Originally over-valued, the price of the
bonds started to drop. Persons in the commercial paper and repo markets
who had been willing to lend based on MBS bonds as assets became
suspicious, as they had trouble telling which bonds were safe and which
were not. As fear spread, these persons moved from an overly optimistic
assumption that all bonds were fine to an overly pessimistic assumption
that none were safe, and they started to charge higher interest rates or
require higher "haircuts" on repos as investors tried to roll over their
loans, or became unwilling to lend at any price.37
This put pressure on the MBS investors who needed to roll over
their loans. Theoretically, an MBS bond market should have helped as
compared with traditional bank runs, because part of the problem for
traditional banks was that there was no market for their loans, so they
could not raise money by selling their loans when necessary. But at this
crucial moment, the MBS bond markets, never all that liquid to begin
with, became illiquid. Everyone wanted to sell all at once, as many
investors faced the same problem at the same time. No one wanted to
buy. Arbitrageurs were willing to buy, but only at very low prices, given
the costs and risks of arbitrage. Investors were unwilling to sell at such
low prices because doing so would force them to record losses on their
balance sheets,38 and they preferred to hold on as long as possible in the
36. RAJAN, supra note 7, at 17-18.
37. GORTON, supra note 7, at 133-35.
38. Many believe that mark to market accounting exacerbated this problem, though
its role in the crisis is controversial. See id. at 130-32; see also Tobias Adrian & Hyun
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hope that the markets would steady. But some were forced to sell at fire
sale prices, and the price of MBS bonds plummeted. Thus, the basic
logic of bank runs re-asserted itself in the shadow banking world.
Financial institutions had invested in MBS bonds, long-term assets that,
in a pinch, were not liquid, and they had financed those assets with short-
term, highly liquid debt. When the holders of that debt became
distrustful, trouble ensued.
One debate is how much the MBS bond price drop represented a
rational adjustment to the real underlying risk of default. One view is
that MBS bonds were just bad assets, and the companies holding them
were in many cases insolvent. This is the fundamentalist theory of bank
runs. 40 A different view is that just as markets over-reacted in setting
prices too high initially, they then over-reacted in the other direction and
set prices too low. This is the liquidity theory of bank runs.4 1 As usual,
both have some truth. An important question, which economists must
eventually sort out, is the relative contribution of each story to this crisis.
The crisis spread to other financial markets. Many financial
companies lost money through their ownership of MBS bonds and CDS
derivatives and the like. They became much less willing to make new
loans as they conserved cash to try to preserve their balance sheets. The
balance sheets for big companies were murky to outsiders (and to
insiders, for that matter), so it was quite unclear who had been hardest
hit. That lack of clarity led to spreading mistrust, and financial
companies became unwilling to deal with each other based on the fear
that new potential debtors would be unable to repay their loans. 4 2 And
then, as is normal with financial crises, the downturn spread from
financial markets to the real world; as businesses found themselves
unable to get loans, unemployment grew, and this in turn caused
consumers to cut back. This cutback fed back into the financial crisis, as
housing mortgage defaults spread well beyond subprime mortgages,
worsening the whole MBS market fiasco.
We have identified a number of specific problems that the crisis has
revealed, and have also seen its general similarity to a traditional bank
run, albeit with major details altered. Other trends helped feed the boom
that led to the bust. The Federal Reserve kept interest rates quite low for
years following the recession at the beginning of the decade, which
Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage 30 (May 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.princeton.edu/-hsshin/www/LiquidityLeverage.pdf.
39. GORTON, supra note 7, at 125-27.
40. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
42. See GORTON, supra note 7, at 112-13.
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helped pull money into financial markets.43 High levels of savings in
several large countries, particularly China, also poured into the U.S.
financial system. Various government policies encouraged too much
investment in the housing market, including tax laws and Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. The relative importance of these various factors and
the types of financial market failures that I have stressed is heavily
debated.4
If we now think about what happened at a higher level of
abstraction, we can see the crisis as a stage in the evolution of the
financial world as an evolving complex system.45 We might say that the
modern financial system features "complexity cubed.A 6 There are three
layers of difficulties:
* Individual financial products-those MBS bonds-have
become extremely complicated and hard to understand and
value. This confusion builds as, over time, modular elements of
47older products are combined in new ways.
* Large financial companies have also become more complicated,
offering more complicated products and operating in more
sophisticated markets. It is not clear that the people running our
leading financial companies had any real sense of what their
companies were worth, what some important departments were
doing, or what sort of risks those departments were creating for
their companies.48 Certainly few outsiders, regulators included,
understood these matters.
43. RAJAN, supra note 7, at 15. But monetary policy is hard: slow employment
growth in recoveries following recent recessions creates pressure to keep interest rates
down until employment recovers.
44. Compare, e.g., Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Slump Goes On: Why?, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Aug. 31, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/sep/30/
slump-goes-why/, with Raghuran Rajan, Reviewing Krugman, IGM FORUM (Sept. 16,
2010), http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/brian.barry/igm/reviewingkrugman.pdf.
45. See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, ET AL., THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING
COMPLEX SYSTEM 11 (Santa Fe Inst. Ser. No. 27, 1997).
46. We might say it, but note, using "complexity" in the sense developed at the
Santa Fe Institute, see id., the first two levels of complexity in the text may really just be
complicated, not complex. The editors of the Santa Fe Institute volume identify six
features of the economy that collectively help define the complexity approach to
economics: dispersed interaction, no global controller, cross-cutting hierarchical
organization, continual adaptation, perpetual novelty, and out-of-equilibrium dynamics.
Id. at 3-4. But "complicatedness cubed" doesn't sound as good.
47. Which arguably may make them complex in the technical sense.
48. ROuBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 208.
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* Markets have become increasingly complex4 9 as these financial
products and companies interact in new and unexpected ways.
Innovations breed new innovations at a fast rate. The system is
quite tightly coupled, as developments in one market quickly
affect other markets through a series of ties between them.
Complex systems of this sort can be fiendishly hard to understand
and predict. Recent past experience can be highly misleading-such a
system can coast along smoothly for years before becoming highly
chaotic and unstable. Positive feedback mechanisms can lead to
sustained bubbles, which then burst and become sustained busts.o
Coordinated expectations can extend the booms and then the busts even
if underlying economic fundamentals are barely changed.5'
Pity the poor regulator faced with such a system, particularly where
that system is critical to the health of our entire economy and society.
Not even the highly-trained and motivated persons running the biggest
companies can predict where the system is headed, or when and what in
detail 52 may go wrong. Government regulators, at least in the U.S. where
government service is less socially valued than in many other advanced
economies, are likely to be behind the ball, and when they do concoct
new regulations to address perceived risks, market participants will
quickly adapt to get around those regulations as much as possible.
And yet, the task of financial regulation is not completely
impossible. Following the New Deal financial regulations, the U.S.
enjoyed roughly a half-century of relative stability and high growth, far
and away the longest such period in our nation's history. Why did that
period come to an end? Opinions differ, to say the least. I would point
to two main trends. First, the monetary and fiscal policy that propped up
the economy when crises threatened was ultimately inflationary, as
overly-risky new financial strategies went unpunished.54 The inflation of
49. And here I really do mean complex in the technical sense.
50. W. Brian Arthur et al., Asset Prices Under Endogenous Expectation in Artificial
Stock Markets, in W. BRIAN ARTHUR ET AL., THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX
SYSTEM 11 15 (1997).
51. The business cycle theories of Minsky and to a lesser extent Hayek exhibit these
features. See infra Part III.C.
52. That "in detail" matters a lot. The general contours repeat over time, but
regulators must address the details.
53. Perhaps the most sustained attempt by a law professor to analyze financial
regulation from the standpoint of complexity theory is by Steven Schwarcz. See Steven
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211
(2009); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193 (2008); Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic
Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L. REV. 209 (2008).
54. We shall see that this is a common thread for both Hayek and Minsky. See infra
Part III.C.
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the nineteen-seventies eventually undermined the Keynesian approach.
Second, decades of stability and profits induced financial sector
entrepreneurs to try new innovations, and to push for deregulation to
allow such innovations. As memories of the Great Depression
disappeared, caution and restraint became harder to maintain.55 Even
though the New Deal structure still underlies our system of financial
regulation, that regulatory structure has been much weakened and the
financial system has become far more complex and diverse. Regulators
today must try to make sense of a bewildering new world that in many
ways they do not understand, and which keeps shifting in front of them,
partially in response to their attempts at reining it in.
III. HAYEK, OAKESHOTT, KEYNES
How do we go about regulating financial markets and institutions in
light of the vast uncertainty that confronts both the regulators and the
regulated? The problem is not unique to the world of finance. Indeed,
almost any intellectually honest attempt to apply consequentialist
reasoning to devising rules in any sphere where serious debate exists
runs into a wall. Both theory and facts speak with forked tongues. Harry
Truman wished in vain for a one-handed economist (to switch metaphors
to a different body part).
But while our dilemma is not unique to financial regulation, it is
particularly acute here. Participants in financial markets must value all
sorts of instruments and entities whose value depends upon uncertain
future events. Lots of money is bet on those futures. The presence of
big money and the lure of future riches when the bets pay off attract
thousands of very bright and highly motivated persons. They use their
brains to devise a dizzying array of schemes, growing ever more
complicated as they morph rapidly while drawing upon the structures of
past schemes. Money flows in these markets determine which
businesses have money to expand, while also providing the short and
medium term financing that many businesses need to survive the ebbs
and flows of revenues and expenditures: if capital markets fail,
capitalism fails. History, measured in both months and centuries,
suggests that no society has been able to maintain a financial system that
is both dynamic and stable for very long. Failing to regulate the financial
system is highly likely to result in economic strife. And yet, we must
55. Allegedly, John Kenneth Galbraith predicted that the next great American
financial crisis would occur 15 years after the first post-Depression President was elected.
Bill Clinton, born in 1946, was elected in 1992; the crisis hit in 2007. It may be
apocryphal, but it's such a great story that who has the heart to check up on it?
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still choose (even choosing to do nothing and let markets do their thing is
a choice).
But our ignorance, while vast, is not complete. We do have some
economic theory to give us guidance as to what financial markets do well
and where they tend to have problems, and we have plenty of historical
experience from which we can learn. In Part II, I laid out some of the
major elements that steered America's financial system into its latest
crisis. As this paper continues I will expand upon that discussion. How
should we use what knowledge we do have to design financial
regulation, while remaining aware of how limited that knowledge is?
Given the limits of our knowledge, we must necessarily fall back
upon broad background understandings of how we should regulate.
Technical economic studies, though important, are not enough because
they do not answer enough of our questions. We all come to social and
economic problems with certain attitudes and preconceptions that will
play a major role in shaping our responses. These background
preconceptions need not go unquestioned, however. We can examine
these preconceptions at a general level, and see how much help they give
us in understanding and responding to this crisis.
It is here, then, that we turn to our three great guides to how to go
about regulating in the face of uncertainty: Hayek, Oakeshott, and
Keynes. Why these three men? There are several reasons. For one, a
central concern is how to regulate a complex social system in the face of
pervasive uncertainty and limited knowledge, and we want as our guides
thinkers who faced up to our limited knowledge and put it at the
forefront of their thinking. Hayek, Oakeshott, and Keynes are three of
the twentieth century's most acute thinkers about social action in the face
of pervasive uncertainty. Two of them, Hayek and Keynes, were and
remain among the most deep and creative theorists of the relationship
between financial markets, uncertainty, and business cycles.
Beyond that, the three men give us high-level representative
thinkers within each of the three leading intellectual and political
tendencies that dominate American public life: libertarianism,
conservatism, and Progressivism or liberalism. Most Americans, myself
included, feel tugs of at least some real urgency in each of these
directions. Thinkers and schemes that fall well outside of these three
tendencies are simply not viable options within the U.S. today." Thus,
56. Were I European, I would probably want to include a thinker within the socialist,
or at least social democratic, tradition (and no, Keynes does not count). But I'm not
European. Moreover, I am rather hard-pressed to think of a major thinker within that
tradition who really grapples with uncertainty and the limits of reason at the core of his or
her thinking. Were I to include a fourth person, it might well be John Dewey. While not
quite a socialist within the European tradition, Dewey was a more thoroughly Progressive
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in this part and the next I shall explore how arguably the greatest thinkers
on the limits of human reason within our three leading political and
intellectual traditions approach the task of regulating within the limits of
our knowledge, and also how each critiques the strategies of the others.
A. Hayek
Hayek is probably the most profound and possibly the most
influential57 libertarian thinker of the twentieth century. Libertarian
ideas have profoundly affected American thought and politics from the
Founding Fathers to the Tea Partiers today. In his most profound essay,
Hayek stresses the vastness of the problem of using knowledge to make
economic decisions.ss Knowledge is spread among all human beings,
but much of that knowledge is tacit and cannot be systematized, written
down, or communicated to others. As Hayek wrote:
[T]here is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized
knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific, in the sense of
knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that
practically every individual has some advantage over all others
because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use
might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions
depending on it are left to him or are made with his active
cooperation.59
Thus, decision-making must be mostly decentralized, with each
person deeply involved in the decisions focused on their own personal
circumstances, if we are to use much of the important knowledge that
humans possess. With the advance of civilization this becomes ever
more true, as persons become more specialized and more of their
activities embody tacit knowledge built up from past practices.6 0 And
yet, these decentralized decisions must be coordinated. Prices in the
market system perform that function, conveying in simple signals
figure than Keynes, and would provide us with a harder push in that direction. Moreover,
Dewey can be seen as a quite interesting thinker on the role of uncertainty and the limits
to reason, though perhaps less explicitly so than the three considered here. For a very
thoughtful treatment of Dewey from that perspective, which closely compares Dewey
with Hayek, see Colin Koopman, Morals and Markets: Liberal Democracy Through
Dewey and Hayek, 23 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL. 151 (2009).
57. Touche, Milton Friedman.
58. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
59. Id. at 521-22.
60. Id. at 522-24.
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information about the costs and benefits to others of activities, so that
each of us can account for the costs and benefits of our own decisions.
Central planning, the state's effort to dictate economic decisions in
great detail, is thus doomed because it cannot access critical information
necessary for achieving any remotely efficient result. But matters are
worse than this suggests. Not only is central planning doomed to fail to
supply rational means to achieve its ends, but also planning in detail
must involve the state in deciding among conflicting ends advanced by
62
competing persons and groups. Trying to solve this conflict requires
putting great discretionary power in the hands of administrative agencies.
Given their lack of information, these agencies must fail in their tasks.
But in the process of failing these agencies will spread their tentacles
further and further into all areas of the economy and society. In The
Road to Serfdom, Hayek argued that this expansion of administrative
agencies would ultimately lead to totalitarianism.
Hayek was thus particularly alarmed at the development of the
modem administrative state, and he pondered how state agencies could
be made consistent with liberty. Hayek resolved that agencies must
conform to the rule of law. Statutes and regulations under the rule of law
must dictate answers in advance, rather than allowing administrators to
apply their own judgment as to the best outcome in particular
circumstances ex post. Wrote Hayek in The Constitution ofLiberty:
The conception of freedom under the law that is the chief concern of
this book rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense
of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to
us, we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore free. It
is because the lawgiver does not know the particular cases to which
his rules will apply, and it is because the judge who applies them has
no choice in drawing the conclusions that follow from the existing
body of rules and the particular facts of the case, that it can be said
that laws and not men rule.64
Given this conception of the rule of law, the welfare state and the
regulatory state pose threats much like that which central planning poses,
because the spread of powerful administrative agencies with large
degrees of discretion is very similar. Hayek would surely condemn the
vast vesting of discretion in administrative agencies that is a key
61. Id.at525-27.
62. Hayek, Freedom and the Economic System, 153 CONTEMP. REV. 434, 439
(1938).
63. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 49-51 (1944).
64. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960).
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characteristic of the Dodd-Frank Act. We shall have to think very
carefully about this discretion when we turn to analyzing the Act later.
Yet despite his alarm at the growth of the modern state, Hayek
believed that the state does play an important role. "Probably nothing
has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of
some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of
laissez faire."65 Hayek recognized that the market on its own will get
some important things wrong, and that the state must address this issue.
Hayek further recognized that stabilizing the economy so as to avoid
periods of high unemployment is one of those tasks.66 Hayek even
granted that a state-run central bank with discretionary power to control
the money supply is necessary for that task.67 He did so, though, rather
reluctantly, and he put more stress on avoiding the dangers of inflation
rather than depression because he saw inflation as the more likely threat
68
in the context of a spreading administered economy.
Hayek has been influential in the deregulatory tendencies of recent
69
decades. He was a major influence on Margaret Thatcher, for instance.
Many developments in economics over the last few decades have
suggested that markets generally work on their own and that government
intervention is usually unwise. But the belief that markets generally
work on their own assumes an unrealistic degree of perfection in markets
and is thus less realistic and wise than Hayek's own arguments. Some
modern analyses, however, including those done on financial crises, have
admitted serious imperfections in markets yet have still argued against
government intervention because the information required to properly
intervene is quite detailed and without such information intervention may
well make things worse. This sort of analysis gives more formal and
detailed support for the kinds of arguments Hayek made.70
B. Oakeshott
Michael Oakeshott was one of the twentieth century's most
important thinkers in the conservative tradition of Edmund Burke. A
profound analysis of knowledge and the limits of rationalism lies at the
heart of Oakeshott's thought-his most famous essay is titled
65. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 71 (1944).
66. Id. at 148-49; HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 264 (1960).
67. HAYEK, TiHE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 334-37 (1960).
68. Id. at 327-28.
69. For some quotes from Thatcher lauding Hayek, see The Friedrich Hayek Quote
Page, TAKING HAYEK SERIOUSLY, http://hayekcenter.org/friedrichhayek/
hayekquote.htm#liberalism (last visited June 25, 2011).
70. A good example is ALLEN & GALE, supra note 9.
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Rationalism in Politics. 71 Oakeshott starts with an analysis of human
knowledge quite close to that of Hayek. He distinguishes technical
knowledge from practical or traditional knowledge. Practical knowledge
"exists only in use, is not reflective, and (unlike technique) cannot be
formulated in rules." 7 2 Oakeshott frequently illustrates the distinction
with the use of tools. Although one can learn some aspects of using tools
from written directions, much knowledge comes from experience that
cannot be put down and passed on in words.73
Oakeshott argues that modern thought puts far too much emphasis
on technical knowledge. This emphasis on technique has extended to
modern politics. Politics has come to be seen by intellectuals and
academics as applying reason to solve various social problems: "The
conduct of affairs, for the Rationalist, is a matter of solving problems,
and in this no man can hope to be successful whose reason has become
inflexible by surrender to habit or is clouded by the fumes of tradition." 7 4
Oakeshott believed that such rationalism is doomed to failure,
because its understanding of knowledge is too thin and will thus serve as
an inadequate guide to action. Wrote Oakeshott, "[The rationalist's]
knowledge will never be more than half-knowledge, and consequently he
will never be more than half-right."75
Oakeshott defends conservatism as a disposition based in part upon
the inadequacy of technical knowledge as a guide to action. Our modem,
liberal society contains many very different types of persons pursuing
very different types of ends and behaving in very different types of ways.
But over time, we have learned to adjust our behavior to those of others.
"Our conduct consists of activity assimilated to that of others in small,
and for the most part unconsidered and unobtrusive, adjustments."7 6
A rationalist examines individualistic behavior and wants to impose
his or her own vision of optimal outcomes. But a conservative is deeply
skeptical of anyone's ability to do so in a way that does not lead to bad
outcomes. The conservative believes that:
[I]t is beyond human experience to suppose that those who rule are
endowed with a superior wisdom which discloses to them a better
71. MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 12 (1962).
72. Id
73. Id. at 14.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id at 36. Though half-right ain't half-bad.
76. OAKESHOTT, On Being Conservative, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 407, 425 (1962).
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range of beliefs and activities and which gives them authority to
impose upon their subjects a quite different manner of life.77
A further argument is based directly upon the difficulty of
predicting the consequences of attempted political reforms. Change
means upsetting existing conditions, conditions to which we have
evolved and with which we have become comfortable, or at least
accommodated ourselves. It involves only uncertain future benefits, and
likely unintended bad consequences. The burden of proof thus must be
on reformers to produce good reasons as to why we should engage in
their pet projects. As Oakeshott puts it:
Whenever there is innovation there is the certainty that the change
will be greater than was intended, that there will be loss as well as
gain and that the loss and the gain will not be equally distributed
among the people affected; there is the chance that the benefits
derived will be greater than those which were designed; and there is
the risk that they will be off-set by changes for the worse.
In making this argument, Oakeshott followed a perhaps unlikely
predecessor: Keynes. The great biographer of Keynes, Robert Skidelsky,
lays much emphasis upon an undergraduate essay by Keynes on Burke.
A key argument in the essay prefigured Keynes's later understanding of
uncertainty:
Burke ever held, and held rightly, that it can seldom be right . .. to
sacrifice a present benefit for a doubtful advantage in the future ...
It is not wise to look too far ahead; our powers of prediction are
slight, our command over results infinitesimal.... We can never
know enough to make the chance worth taking. There is this further
consideration that is often in need of emphasis: it is not sufficient
that the state of affairs which we seek to promote should be better
than the state of affairs which preceded it; it must be sufficiently
better to make up for the evils of the transition.79
Skidelsky believed this idea to be critical to understanding Keynes's
approach to policymaking throughout his life, linking it to one of
Keynes's most famous sentences from later in his life: "In the long run
we are all dead."80
Based upon this reasoning, Oakeshott concluded that we should be
reluctant to try political reforms at all. Reform is likely to be more
77. Id. at 427.
78. Id. at 411.
79. Quoted in ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: THE ECONOMIST AS




desirable where it is small and limited to correcting specific observed
problems. It should be done slowly, with "pauses to observe current
consequences and make appropriate adjustments."81
Like Hayek, Oakeshott greatly valued liberty and limited
government. However, his preference draws upon not some general
economic or philosophical reasoning, but rather from the experience of
being English. Oakeshott spoke approvingly of economist Henry Simons
as follows:
He is a libertarian, not because he begins with an abstract definition
of liberty, but because he has actually enjoyed a way of living (and
seen others enjoy it) which those who have enjoyed it are accustomed
(on account of certain precise characteristics) to call a free way of
living, and because he has found it to be good.82
Thus, Oakeshott does not give us a general prescription for what
rules societies should have on any particular topic, much less our specific
concern of financial regulation. Rather, Oakeshott provides a disposition
for how we should go about practicing politics, and reasons for being
skeptical of sweeping reforms which follow from someone's elaborate
social scientific arguments. One imagines that the significant grab for
power by Congress and the financial agencies and the need for hectic
rulemaking on hundreds of topics that are core elements of the Dodd-
Frank Act would provoke deep skepticism from Oakeshott were he still
alive.
And yet, perhaps many of the financial industry practices that
caused the crisis would have provoked his skepticism as well. The
financial engineering that dominated Wall Street for the last several
decades represents a triumph of technique over tradition. Bankers
created new financial instruments and took big risks, confident that their
precise risk models would guide them well. More cautious, older
methods of banking were seen as pass6, at least by the cool kids who had
the new ways and the big bucks. One suspects that Oakeshott would
prefer George Bailey over Mr. Potter as a model for bankers, but the
81. OAKESHOTr, supra note 76, at 412.
82. OAKESHoTF, The Political Economy of Freedom, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS
AND OTHER ESSAYS 384, 387 (1962).
83. See RAJAN, supra note 7, at 143. BHIDE, supra note 21, mounts a similar
argument using Hayek's theory of tacit information, but the argument is more persuasive
within a Burkean conservative perspective-presumably Hayek would not want to
interfere with this market phenomenon. But see discussion supra note 21.
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Potter party has won out in modem banking. 84 How should we respond
to that?
C Keynes
Our final great thinker on uncertainty is John Maynard Keynes.
Keynes falls within the liberal tradition, or what in the U.S. we
sometimes call the progressive end of the political spectrum. Keynes
turns our attention from the limitations of central planning and regulation
to the limitations of the market in the face of our lack of knowledge. At
the same time that Frank Knight was distinguishing between risk and
uncertainty, Keynes published his Treatise on Probability.8 6 Like
Knight, Keynes denied that all probability statements could be
quantified. Sometimes we can assign clear numbers to probabilistic
statements, such as when there is a series of related events and the event
in question has been observed to occur some fraction of all occurrences.
The canonical example is flipping a fair coin. Other times we can say
that one event is more likely than another event but not apply a specific
measure to either-we have an ordinal but not a cardinal ordering. And
yet other times we cannot even say that one event is more or less likely
than another event-a case of true unquantifiable uncertainty in the
87
Knightian sense.
In his General Theory, Keynes argues that uncertainty is
particularly crucial in the context of businesses making investment
decisions.
[The entrepreneur ... has to form the best expectations he can as to
what the consumers will be prepared to pay when he is ready to
supply them .. . after the elapse of what may be a lengthy period; and
he has no choice but to be guided by these expectations, if he is to
produce at all by processes which occupy time.
Moreover, "[T]he outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the
basis of knowledge on which our estimates of prospective yield have to
be made." 89
84. See IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946). I mean that-see it. The
bank run scene explains fractional reserve banking and bank runs better than I do supra
Part II.
85. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1922)
86. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY (1921).
87. See id. at 20-40.
88. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST,
AND MONEY 46 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1964) (1936).
89. Id. at 149.
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What then are entrepreneurs to do, given the need to make
expensive decisions in the face of grave uncertainty? They fall back on
conventions, the strongest of which is that the present will closely
resemble the recent past.90 But these conventions are brittle and subject
to rapid fluctuation. Much depends on the general level of confidence.91
The existence of stock markets helps to a point-by providing liquidity,
stock markets encourage investors to be more willing to invest, as they
can withdraw their money should troubles arise.9 2 But the stock markets
can instead add to instability-investments are revalued all the time, and
investors can become focused on anticipating short term changes, leading
to herd behavior, booms, and busts.93 When the busts are significant,
even very low interest rates may not be enough to induce new
investment. What is needed is a return of confidence, but that is elusive
and near-impossible to dictate.94
Hyman Minsky has probably done more than any successors of
Keynes to extend this aspect of Keynesian analysis. Minsky analyzed
the banking industry in detail. He showed how, in the presence of
widespread high degrees of leverage, even relatively small bad news can
lead to a downward cascade: as borrowers default, banks face possible
runs, and banks become unwilling to lend additional funds.95  Sound
familiar? Minsky's analysis is anchored in the understanding of banking
crises discussed in Part II.
More depressingly (and hence insightfully), Minsky argued that
periods of financial calm lead to their own demise. As memories of bad
times dim, banks and businesses become willing to take on more risk.96
Leverage (a great way to increase profits as long as things go well)
grows and financial innovations proliferate. But once everyone has
taken on huge piles of debt, the stage is set for a financial crisis and
recession.9 7
Thus, left to their own devices, private financial markets and
institutions are unstable due to the uncertainties that attend large
investments over time. Can the state do anything to stabilize this reality?
Keynes focused mainly on macroeconomic tools: monetary and fiscal
policy. Intelligent policy can reign in booms and help stimulate the
90. Id at 152.
91. Id at 148.
92. Id. at 150-51.
93. Id. at 150-55.
94. Id at 315-17.
95. HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 219-45 (2d ed. 2008).
96. Id. at 237.
97. Id. at 244-45. Beyond the dimming of memories of bad times, another piece of
psychology may worsen the tendency. Gamblers tend to take on more risk after a bout of
winning-they see themselves as playing with house money.
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economy out of busts. Is regulation of financial institutions and markets
a part of the Keynesian solution? Keynes himself did not say much on
that question. He was certainly open to the possibility of serious
government regulation in general, as the title of his essay The End of
Laissez-Faire suggests.98 And given that Keynes saw financial markets
as a core source of instability, they certainly seem a plausible candidate
for regulation.
Yet, Keynes does not clearly make a case for regulating financial
markets generally, much less set out in any sort of detail what such
regulation might look like. About the only specific proposal of such sort
one finds in the General Theory is the suggestion of a transfer tax on
stock exchange transactions.9 9 Beyond that, he vaguely suggests the
"socialization" of investment decisions.100 Whatever that means.
Minsky gives some more detail, and as per his character, Minsky
does so with greater pessimism than Keynes. State interventions to save
failing financial institutions and prop up the economy are likely to
encourage further financial speculation, as private actors have less fear of
failure-a problem that is now obviously pressing. Disaster is averted,
but Minsky argues that inflation results.101  Minsky sees financial
regulation as an important part of an adequate response, 10 2 but he does
not provide much detail. This is partially because he sees the regulatory
task as constantly evolving. Banks will adapt their strategies in response
to whatever regulators do, requiring further responses from the
regulators.103 The task is Sisyphean, 104 but necessary.10 5
A Keynesian perspective also helps call attention to how the growth
of the financial sector has helped increase economic and political
inequality in recent decades. 10 6  Not only have participants in the
financial markets been among the biggest winners in recent years, but the
growth of markets has also played a major role in the growth of
98. KEYNES, The End of Laissez-Faire (1926), reprinted in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION
312 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1963).
99. KEYNES, supra note 88, at 160.
100. Id. at 378, 164; cf Keynes, supra note 98, at 318.
101. Minsky, supra note 95, at 301.
102. Id. at 349-65.
103. Id. at 370.
104. "One must imagine Sisyphus happy." ALBERT CAMUS, The Myth of Sisyphus, in
THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS 119, 123 (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage
International 1991) (1942).
105. In Brett McDonnell, Of Mises and Min(sky): Libertarian and Liberal Responses
to Financial Crises Past and Present, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1279 (forthcoming 2011), I
go into more detail on the development of a post-Keynesian approach to financial
regulation.
106. See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007); PAUL
KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009).
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compensation for CEOs and other top managers, and hence in growing
inequality within corporations. The financial sector has achieved great
political power, as demonstrated by its ability to lobby for major bailouts
with remarkably little punishment of the leaders of the bailed-out
companies during the recent crisis. o0
Subsequent economists have extended and deepened the insights of
Keynes and Minsky. Minsky himself is often linked with a group of
economists known as "Post-Keynesians." These economists were less
mathematically inclined than the post-World War II mainstream, and less
inclined to compromise Keynes's ideas with neoclassical ideas than the
mainstream Keynesianism that dominated economics departments for
several generations. Besides Minsky, the most important post-Keynesian
is Paul Davidson. 108
A somewhat more conventional group of economists called the
"New Keynesians" has extended Keynes's work using more formal
models. The most important strand of this school uses developments in
the theory of asymmetric information to help give microfoundational
explanations for failures in labor and credit markets. Joseph Stiglitz is
the most important figure in this strand of work influenced by Keynes. 09
More recently, economists have moved away from the rationality
assumption that has dominated the profession's mainstream. Economists
have explored various ways in which psychologists have suggested
people will vary from that model. Some economists recently have
applied this so-called behavioral economics to macroeconomic questions.
The results often tend to follow a Keynesian line, and give some more
detail to the idea of "animal spirits."" 0
IV. A CIRCLE OF CRITIQUES
Hayek, Oakeshott, and Keynes each make persuasive points about
the behavior of states and markets in the face of uncertainty and the
limits to our knowledge. But they cannot all be right, can they?"' Or
rather, maybe they are all too right, but mainly to the extent that they
demonstrate the failure of various human institutions given our
ignorance. In this part, I use the ideas of each to critique the ideas of the
107. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 179-88.
108. See generally PAUL DAVIDSON, THE KEYNES SOLUTION: THE PATH TO GLOBAL
PROSPERITY (2009).
109. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 7.
110. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How HUMAN
PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
(2009).
111. "But Tevye, they can't both be right. Tevye: You are right too." JOSEPH STEIN
AND SHELDON HARNICK, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (1964).
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others. Thus, I start by showing how Keynes and Oakeshott can be used
to critique Hayek, and then similarly show how we can critique
Oakeshott and Keynes in turn. If persuasive, we will reach the end of
this section wondering how we can have any idea at all about what to do.
Hence another alternative title for this essay:
Alternative Title: If These Guys Don't Know, Then How Can I?
Hayek, Oakeshott, and Keynes on Uncertainty and Financial Regulation.
A. Keynes & Oakeshott v. Hayek
The Keynesian critique of Hayek is obvious. Hayek dwells on the
many benefits of markets, but he is insufficiently aware of their costs. In
particular, Keynes and various post-Keynesians (especially Minsky) have
persuasively shown how financial institutions and markets generate
systemic instability. History supports their theory: before New Deal
stabilization measures were put in place, the American economy faced
significant financial crises every fifteen to twenty years.1 12
Hayek argued that these crises were often caused by bad
government policies, but his analysis in the 1930s of cycles in credit,
prices, and production suggests a more subtle story.113 Hayek
emphasizes the importance that more capital-intensive production
involves investment decisions that take time, and typically more time for
more capital. Entrepreneurs may make mistakes and over-optimistically
invest in processes that prove not worth it. At some point they realize
the errors of their ways. At that point, they pull back. This sets in
motion a contractionary process of recession or depression.
Hayek emphasizes overly-expansive monetary policy as the cause
of this malinvestment. However, others have noted that the logic of the
story suggests that malinvestment episodes could well have other causes.
That is, modem financial institutions, on Hayek's own theory, generate
instability. Indeed, there is much in common between Hayek's theory
and Minsky's theory.14
Hayek argues further that once the market begins to unwind the
malinvestments, the government can do nothing to help. Government
interference will simply delay the adjustment and make it worse in the
long run. However, once one realizes that Hayek's theory of the
business cycle points to deep instability in private markets, it is not clear
why the government cannot help. Simply put, one can argue for a
laissez-faire approach either because one believes that markets work well
112. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REP. ON REGULATORY REFORM 2 (Jan. 29,
2009).
113. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION (1931).
114. McDonnell, supra note 105.
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and government intervention isn't needed, or because even though
markets may have big, systematic, and identifiable problems,
government intervention is likely to make things even worse. Much of
the time, Hayek largely tries to take the former position, and certainly his
followers in academia and in politics tend to do the same. But the logic
of his theory of credit and production suggests that only the latter defense
of laissez-faire is truly honest. Given the serious failure of markets to
ensure stability, we need a very strong case indeed for the inevitable
failure of government intervention. The fact that for a half century after
the New Deal America achieved by far its most stable financial markets
ever, and that this stability broke down only after years of financial
deregulation, is powerful evidence against Hayek's anti-regulation
hypothesis." 5
Hayek's position is also a political non-starter. In the face of the
Great Depression, Hayek argued that we should do nothing and wait for
the storm to pass, even though it might take years. Such a position was
political poison then, and it is even more so today as the President is,
above all else, subject to judgment based on the state of the economy.
Moreover, private market actors can and do anticipate that, and after the
massive bailouts of the last crisis, they can and should expect the same
next time, no matter how much some subsequent Hayekian regulators
might want to say it ain't so. This implicit guarantee creates a severe
moral hazard problem-financial market participants will take risks
knowing that if they act in an ill-advised manner, they are likely to be
bailed out. Hayekians (and others) may deplore this notion, but it is an
inescapable reality, further undoing the case for laissez-faire financial
regulation.
Oakeshott offers a more subtle critique of Hayek, though they have
much in common. For all his criticism of rationalism, Hayek's own
intellectual edifice is deeply rationalist. Reasoning from his own version
of economic first principles, Hayek argued for a libertarian society that
deviates in many ways from how American society-or any other
society, for that matter-has evolved. Hayek calls for some radical
changes from the status quo. As Oakeshott noted:
This is, perhaps, the main significance of Hayek's Road to Serfdom-
not the cogency of his doctrine, but the fact that it is a doctrine. A
plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it
belongs to the same style of politics.'1 6
115. For more on Keynes versus Hayek, see McDonnell, supra note 105.
116. Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics, supra note 71, at 26.
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The same point can be seen from the same side in Oakeshott's praise for
the more Burkean libertarianism of Henry Simons quoted earlier."'
But why should we trust this utopian rationalist project much more
than other rationalist projects? We know from the writings of Keynes
and many other economists that there are good theoretical reasons to
think that markets, while they have many vital strengths, also have many
important weaknesses. And the history of financial instability reinforces
those theoretical lessons." 8 Hayek-style libertarians have answers to all
of that theory and history, it is true. But should we take a huge bet that
those libertarian answers are all correct? The principle of Burkean
prudence, recognized by Keynes as well as Oakeshott, counsels against
too radical a move towards laissez-faire from current policy.
As previously noted, Hayek did not believe in a pure laissez-faire
approach.l 9 He recognized many areas where government intervention
is needed to correct market failures, and this includes policies to stabilize
the business cycle and unemployment. However, these sorts of
concessions make Hayek vulnerable to Keynes's response to The Road to
Serfdom. Keynes was greatly impressed with the book. He called it a
"grand book," and said that "[m]orally and philosophically I find myself
in agreement with virtually the whole of it; and not only in agreement,
but in a deeply moved agreement." 20 But Keynes argued that once
Hayek admitted a radical laissez-faire position to be untenable, Hayek
left himself with no principled dividing line between his own position
and that of Keynes:
You admit .. . that it is a question of knowing where to draw the line.
You agree that the line has to be drawn somewhere, and that the
logical extreme is not possible. But you give us no guidance
whatever as to where to draw it. It is true that you and I would
probably draw it in different places. I should guess that according to
my ideas you greatly under-estimate the practicability of the middle
course. But as soon as you admit that the extreme is not possible ...
you are, on your own argument, done for, since you are trying to
persuade us that soon as one moves an inch in the planned direction
you are necessarily launched on the slippery path which will lead you
in the course over the precipice.121
117. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
118. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17; Reinhardt & Rogoff, supra note 17.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR BRITAIN, 1937-
1946 284 (2000).
121. Id. at 285.
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B. Hayek & Keynes v. Oakeshott
Hayek and Oakeshott have much in common. Hayek heavily
praised Burkean conservatives for their appreciation of the merits of
evolved institutions such as language, the common law, and morals, but
he drew a strong line between his philosophy and that of conservatives in
his essay Why IAm Not a Conservative.122 His leading criticism was that
conservatism does not offer an affirmative vision of its own:
Let me now state what seems to me the decisive objection to any
conservatism which deserves to be called such. It is that by its very
nature it cannot offer an alternative to the direction in which we are
moving. It may succeed by its resistance to current tendencies in
slowing down undesirable developments, but, since it does not
indicate another direction, it cannot prevent their continuance. It has,
for this reason, invariably been the fate of conservatism to be dragged
along a path not of its own choosing.123
This difference is particularly important where policy has moved in
a statist direction for a long period of time. Hayek would argue that
liberal ideals then call for large-scale action to roll back accumulated bad
governmental interventions, whereas Oakeshott and fellow conservatives
would call for less change. 124 If one believes that the problems with
America's current financial system stem mainly from too much
government involvement, and particularly the harmful moral hazard
caused by bailouts, then Oakeshott's philosophy might lead to
ineffectual, low-energy attempts that fall short of the needed reform.
Another difference between Hayek and Oakeshott is in their attitude
towards science, and social science in particular. As Hayek says:
Though the liberal certainly does not regard all change as progress,
he does regard the advance of knowledge as one of the chief aims of
human effort and expects from it the gradual solution of such
problems and difficulties as we can hope to solve. Without preferring
the new merely because it is new, the liberal is aware that it is of the
essence of human achievement that it produces something new; and
he is prepared to come to terms with new knowledge, whether he
likes its immediate effects or not.125
Thus, while Oakeshott effectively criticizes Hayek for going too far in
relying on his reasoning to point us towards an ideal liberal society,
122. HAYEK, supra note 64, at 397.
123. Id at 398.
124. Id at 399.
125. Id. at 404.
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Hayek in turn critiques conservatives like Oakeshott for not paying
enough attention to what reason does have to teach us.
Keynes also helps us to see weaknesses in Oakeshott's
conservatism. For one thing, conservatives like Oakeshott have little to
add to help understand the ways in which financial markets and
institutions may cause harm. Worse, those markets and institutions can
evolve very quickly, as large potential profits induce rapid innovation.
How should policymakers respond to the threats that this innovation may
pose? For instance, would a Burkean conservative have allowed the
creation of securitization, which required considerable governmental
support to get started? Would a conservative now be willing to accept
securitization given decades of experience with it, or does the crisis
indicate that securitization was a mistake? Should securitization be
allowed but limited in some ways, and if so, how? Vague bromides
about cautious change do not help much in answering such questions.
The past may teach us something, but it will tell us little about the details
of what has changed, and how those changes may (or may not) cause
problems.
More generally, Keynes argued that conservatives do not pay
enough attention to reason. We have seen that Keynes had a great
respect for Burke and drew heavily upon his cautionary principle. But
Keynes was also critical of Burke with a charge that applies to fellow
Burkeans like Oakeshott as well. Skidelsky put it as follows:
The undergraduate Keynes criticized Burke, as he did Moore, not for
his "method," which he regarded as correct, but for his assumption
that the best results on the whole are to be got by sticking to "rules,"
even if these are based on irrational prejudices. In short, Burke put
the claims of peace and expediency over those of truth and
rationality. The nearest he came to forsaking his own maxim was
when he decided to speak out against the French Revolution. "For, on
this occasion," Keynes wrote, "He maintained that the best possible
course for a rational man was to expound the truth and take his
chance on the event." But remarks like this cannot be construed as
advocacy of truth-telling "regardless of consequences," for what
Keynes was arguing against Burke (and in the spirit of Mill) was that
"whatever the immediate consequences of a new truth may be, there
is a high probability that truth will in the long run lead to better
results than falsehood."' 26
Note that this critique closely resembles Hayek's critique of
Oakeshott-like conservatism. Both men thought that reasoned inquiry
can help extend our knowledge even when it comes to understanding
126. SKIDELSKY, supra note 79, at 62-63.
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societies and economies, and pushed to incorporate that knowledge into
our approach to regulating the economy. It is no coincidence that
Keynes and Hayek were both economists while Oakeshott was a non-
technical philosopher. It is not clear that the general prescriptions of
conservative philosophy help us very much in a technical and fast-
moving area like financial regulation. Respect the past, fine, but does
that mean the past as of 2000, 1970, or 1930? The financial system
evolves rapidly, in part in response to our attempts at regulating it. I can
think of very few instances where conservatism has importantly aided an
economist's understanding of financial regulation. That is not to say that
there are few conservative economists, but rather that the conservative
approaches advocated by Oakeshott and Burke do not seem to play a big
role in aiding analysis in this area.
C. Hayek & Oakeshott v. Keynes
Finally, consider how Hayek and Oakeshott would critique Keynes.
Their core attack is shared: Keynes has too much faith in the power of
reason to shape government action. Oakeshott specifically points to
Keynes as an exemplar of the modem rationalist's overly simplistic
understanding of reason:
[The rationalist] will deplore the unregulated conduct which, because
it is externally unregulated, he will think of as "irrational." But it
will always be difficult for him to entertain the notion that what he
identified as "rational" conduct is in fact impossible, not because it is
liable to be swamped by "insane and irrational springs of sickness in
most men," but because it involves a misrepresentation of the nature
of human conduct. He will readily admit that he has been the victim
of an illusion; but the exact character of the illusion will elude him.
An interesting example of this is afforded by J. M. Keynes's essay,
My Early Beliefs, where a candid attempt to supersede what he
detected as a too narrow idea of "rationality" in behavior is ruined by
a failure to carry out a similar reform of the idea of "irrationality." In
the end, Keynes still retains the idea of "rational" conduct as that
which springs from an independently premeditated purpose, and he
modifies his original exclusive attachment to such conduct by
admitting that much of what it excludes (which he identifies as
"vulgar passions," "volcanic and even wicked impulses," [and]
"spontaneous outbursts") is valuable while nevertheless remaining
"irrational." This is a confused position, and from confusion of this
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sort a fresh attempt to determine the meaning of "rationality" in
conduct is not likely to spring.127
Hayek's critique of the Keynesian reliance on a centralized rationality
focuses more on the simple lack of information necessarily available to
any central regulator.
This generalized philosophical critique can play out in specific
narratives as to what went wrong during the Great Depression and also as
to what went wrong in our current Great Recession. Hayek saw an
overly expansive monetary policy leading to a bubble which must
inevitably burst. Today this is a common claim: specifically, that
Federal Reserve policy in the early 2000s played a major role in creating
the housing bubble which led to the Great Recession.128 One might reply
that wiser policy would not have led to such problems, but the difficulty
of being consistently wise is one of the main lessons to take from Hayek.
Hayek has another major complaint about Keynesian monetary
policy: he believes it is inflationary. "With government in control of
monetary policy, the chief threat in this field has become inflation.
Governments everywhere and at all times have been the chief cause of
the depreciation of the currency." 29
Part of Hayek's critique is political. Unions will push for a full
employment policy, and governments will respond to this pressure with
inflation.130  Part of his argument is economic. As inflationary
expectations take hold, the rate of inflation will need to accelerate in
order to have the same effect on employment as earlier.' 3 ' Minsky's
analysis also highlights the inflationary dangers of Keynesian policy. As
the government saves financial firms that have made risky innovations,
either through individual bailouts or through expansive monetary and
fiscal policy, this reinforces their decisions to take great risks with
financial innovations. If those innovations lead to problems, the
government will step in to provide solutions. In recent decades this came
to be called the Greenspan put. The effect is to create an inflationary
spiral, as institutions take on more and more risk, piling up ever greater
leverage, and no major busts occur to stop them.132
127. MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Rational Conduct, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 99, 115 (1962).
128. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7.
129. HAYEK, supra note 64, at 327.
130. FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, A TIGER BY THE TAIL: THE KEYNESIAN LEGACY OF
INFLATION 65-88 (Sudha R. Shenoy ed., 3d ed. 2009).
131. Id. at 88-95. This presaged a highly influential argument by Friedman. See
Milton Friedman, The Role ofMonetary Policy, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 1 (1968).
132. MINSKY, supra note 95, at 283-316.
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A final Hayekian critique of Keynes is that high levels of regulation
will stifle innovation. One of the greatest benefits of a market economy
is that it promotes innovation and change. A key characteristic of the
liberal temperament, for Hayek, is that it embraces change.13 3 Because
the financial sector is at the heart of a capitalist economy, preventing
changes in finance risks preventing change throughout the economy.
Some are skeptical of the value of many financial innovations in recent
decades. But while some innovations have been harmful, many have
been helpful. Consider, for instance, the financial innovation of venture
capitalism-our current economy, and society as a whole, would be
much less advanced and exciting without it. Thus, stifling creativity in
finance risks stifling all economic creativity. 34
V. COWARDLY INTERVENTIONS
We have seen that each of our three thinkers takes bounded
rationality and deep uncertainty very seriously. Each thinker offers
important insights for how markets and governments are likely to
respond in the face of such uncertainty. Each thinker also offers major
critiques of the insights of their peers. In each case, I cannot help but
find the critiques more persuasive than the positive insights. Perhaps that
is inevitable. Our core starting point is that when it comes to finance,
humans must make big decisions that have long term future effects, and
yet must do so with very limited information and brains that, while
impressive compared with other animals, are all-too-often not up to the
task. Any institution made up of such imperfect components will have
problems; even though markets may help aggregate information in
clever, parsimonious ways, and well-constructed governments may help
guide and constrain individual tendencies, there is only so much one can
do given such suspect building blocks. "Out of the crooked timber of
humanity, no straight thing was ever made."' 3 5
This truism suggests that my title is too optimistic. Perhaps better
would be the following:
Alternative Title: We Are So Doomed: The Inevitable Failure of
Financial Regulation
Or more simply: Alternative Alternative Title: Panic!
133. HAYEK, supra note 64, at 400.
134. For an argument that a relatively large amount, though far from all, financial
innovation of recent decades was useful, see Robert Litan, In Defense of Much, But Not
All, Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/
papers/2010/0217_financialinnovationlitan.aspx.
135. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a General History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, Prop.
6(1784).
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A. Cowardly Interventions-General Guidelines
If none of our three paradigmatic thinkers provides a fully
satisfactory approach to how we should (or should not) regulate in the
face of pervasive uncertainty, where else can we look for guidance?
Here is where it would be really great to present my own alternative
approach to action in the face of uncertainty. This is a pervasive problem
throughout human conduct, so a persuasive approach for handling it
would be a handy thing to have, and would garner an awful lot of
citations.
Alas, I have no such grand philosophy to offer. Rather, I suggest a
muddled compromise triangulating the theories of Hayek, Oakeshott, and
Keynes. I advocate what I will call cowardly interventions by
government regulators in the face of threats to the financial system. The
noun follows Keynes, while the adjective reflects Oakeshott and Hayek.
To start, Clers support a relatively extensive system of financial
regulation. We do not believe that for all kinds of markets. Given the
lessons we have learned from Hayek, we need strong arguments in place
before we start heavily regulating any market. In many areas today, we
probably take regulations too far.136 But Keynes and Minsky, along with
centuries of history, 137 including the recent crisis itself, teach us that the
financial system is one area where we do need strong regulation.
Financial markets on their own are too unstable, and the amount of harm
they can cause to the whole economy is too devastating to be left
unregulated. Moreover, we now have a long history of regulating the
financial market, and although that history has not succeeded in avoiding
crises in their entirety (nor should we expect to do so in the future), this
history has shown ways to reduce the number and severity of crises.
In short, we need a robust but not stifling system of financial
regulation. Where a financial crisis has spotlighted weaknesses in our
current system, we should respond with new regulations that target the
main problems that appear to have led to the crisis. To the extent
possible we should also try to anticipate future crises, or at least build
into the regulatory structure prods to keep regulators vigilant and
searching for new weaknesses during booms.'38
136. One example that hits close to home is the regulation of the legal profession.
Milton Friedman was right: there is no need for mandatory licensing for lawyers or
doctors (I am a little less sure about the latter than the former.). MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (40th anniversary ed. 2002).
137. See REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 17; KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note
17.




But these new regulatory initiatives should be cowardly. They
should not go too far beyond existing rules. They should build upon
existing and past rules. They should, as far as possible, try to work with,
rather than against, markets and leave room for a reasonable degree of
financial innovation. Where there is great doubt as to the efficacy of a
proposed rule, we should consider delaying with further study,
implementing a watered-down version of the rule, or simply waiting until
the next crisis.13 9 We should also always be on the lookout for instances
where governmental interventions have created harmful unintended
consequences. Where they have, we should strongly consider ending
those interventions. If that is not desirable because they are the best way
to address a truly serious flaw in financial markets, then we should try to
repair the collateral damage intervention has caused, preferably in a way
that mimics what the market would do to the extent possible. 14 0
Hayek's analysis also suggests that as far as possible we should
strive to put in place clear, determinate rules that tell companies ex ante
what actions are and are not allowed. We should not multiply the
number of such rules unnecessarily. But there are countervailing
considerations that we can see from the Keynesian direction. The ever-
growing complexity of the financial world makes simple, clear rules very
hard to write, and even if we succeed in writing such rules for a moment
in time, practices are likely to evolve around those rules in ways that
soon leave them outdated. Regulators will need some flexibility in order
to restrict practices that attempt an end run around the rules, and rules are
quite likely to grow in complexity along with the subject matter of their
regulation. We need to encourage an adaptive regulatory system that
constantly pushes the regulators to re-think their approaches. The rules
141
should be as simple and stable as is desirable, but no more So.
I have painted cowardly interventions as borrowing from all three
thinkers rather than fitting in within any one of them. In actuality, I
139. Among recent commentators on the crisis, Rajan captures much of the spirit. "In
defending the basic structure of a system that has failed, I face the risk of being dismissed
as a conservative, and unregenerate apologist, or worse, a toady of banking interests that
favor the status quo. But although systemic failure does imply the need for serious
reform, it does not mean that a radically different system would be better. I believe that
we have to work to fix the problems I have identified, which are serious indeed." RAJAN,
supra note 7, at 155.
140. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, at 411.
141. The arguments in this paragraph track the extensive literature on rules versus
standards. See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules and
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REv. 23 (2000); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under
Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REv. 22 (1992).
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believe that Keynes and Oakeshott were both arguably Clers.142 As to
Keynes, although I am using him here as an exemplar of government
intervention, Keynes was himself looking for a middle way between the
conservatism and socialism of his day. We have seen his appreciation
for Burkel 4 3 and for The Road to Serfdom.'" Keynes's search for a
middle way also shows in his attachment to the Liberal Party as opposed
to Labour or the Conservatives. 145  Keynes might well agree with a
program of cowardly interventions, although I doubt he would be thrilled
with the adjective. 146
A Burkean conservative like Oakeshott could also be comfortable
with cowardly interventions. Such conservatives are not opposed to all
regulatory interventions; they just do not want to do too much too fast.
There is room for conservatives to accept a fair number of new rules in
response to urgent need demonstrated by a crisis, particularly in a
technical area like financial regulation which is well removed from the
kind of moral regulation which is closest to the hearts of most
conservatives.
It is a much greater stretch to say that cowardly interventions fit
within a Hayekian approach. Certainly most present-day disciples of
Hayek, generally rather extreme libertarians, would advocate reduced
government involvement and regulation rather than more, and that seems
in keeping with the genuine spirit of Hayek. 147 Still, we have seen that
Hayek did recognize that there exists a real need for government
involvement in stabilizing the financial sector. 14 8 And we have seen that
Keynes plausibly critiqued A Road to Serfdom by arguing that all Hayek
really establishes is a difference in degree rather than kind from what
142. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text.
145. See Keynes, Am I a Liberal?, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 323 (1932); Keynes,
Liberalism and Labour, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 339 (1932).
146. Keynes was more confident in the wisdom of his policy prescriptions than am I
in mine. Given his vastly greater intelligence and vision, he had much justification. But
brilliance can lead to over-confidence. We plodders at least are more likely to exhibit the
virtue of humility.
147. Late in his career, Hayek toyed with the radical idea of de-nationalizing money.
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, CHOICE IN CURRENCY: A WAY TO STOP INFLATION (1976),
available at http://mises.org/resources/3983; FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION
OF MONEY: THE ARGUMENT REFINED (3d ed. 1990), http://mises.org/resources/3970.
148. In McDonnell, supra note 105, I argue that Hayek's analysis of credit cycles
actually suggests a great degree of instability in financial systems, and can be pushed to
grudgingly accept a large degree of regulation in the area. Indeed, some followers of
Hayek have advocated eliminating fractional reserve banking, a far bolder regulatory
move than anything one will find among cowardly interventions. See MURRAY




Keynes himself advocated.14 9 So, while I would not characterize my
approach to cowardly interventions as fitting within a spectrum of
possible Hayekian positions, I do think it is not that far away from the
most squishy moderate positions on that spectrum.
Another attraction of cowardly interventions is that they are
politically feasible, although not easy. Neither complete deregulation
nor massive new regulation to squeeze out almost all financial innovation
is politically possible, at least not until we experience a financial crisis
that goes much further than even the current troubles. Such extreme
changes pose too much risk and offend too many special interests to be
practicable. By contrast, the main political hurdle to cowardly
interventions is the tendency to industry capture-too often bankers are
able to influence politicians and bureaucrats to write rules that favor
them. The financial industry is well organized and resistant to regulation
that would reduce profits and profitable innovations. This is particularly
true given the development of financial behemoths with great political
clout, with Goldman Sachs as the poster child.150 Outside of times of
crises, few people pay attention to financial regulation; that is a recipe
for industry capture. 151
During times of crisis, however, ordinary citizens do pay attention,
and indeed often experience revulsion against the industry. Populist
legislation becomes possible during these times. The trick is coming up
with sensible regulation and maintaining the strength of that regulation
during boom times when popular attention has turned elsewhere. My
colleague Dan Schwarcz and I have explored some mechanisms for
doing this,152 and in Part VI I will consider elements of the Dodd-Frank
Act that may succeed, at least partially.153
The balance of political risks looks different in different eras. In the
post-World War II period to the mid-1970s, over-regulation was the
greater risk. The stagflation crisis of the 1970s was in part the result.
Since then, under-regulation has become our bigger temptation. The
basic politics of capture have combined with a more intellectual and
cultural form of change that has occurred in recent decades, leading to an
intellectual climate that strongly favors markets over governments. The
Tea Party is just a new and particularly extreme manifestation of this
149. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
150. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 5-6.
151. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965),
reprinted in CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 2007);
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Charles K. Rowley ed., 1958); George
Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
152. See McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 138.
153. See infra notes 223-232 and accompanying text.
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tendency. One might have thought that the awful performance of the
most critical markets in our system would have led to changed thinking,
and the first year or two of the Obama Administration, including the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, did suggest some change. However,
even in the time since the first draft of this paper was finished, I have
been astonished by how quickly the pressure to cut back dramatically on
new regulation has increased.15 4 I knew that opposition would strengthen
eventually, but only a few years after the onslaught of the crisis, while
the country is still barely recovering? The speed of the backlash is
striking.
B. How Should Clers Respond to this Crisis?
What are the general contours of regulation that Clers should
advocate today in the wake of the crisis of 2008? To answer this
question, we must consider the major causes of the crisis as discussed in
Part II with guidance from the insights of Keynes and Minsky. In
essence, we witnessed a more complex version of a traditional bank run.
The shadow banking system and securitization created a batch of new
businesses and markets that were not banks as traditionally and legally
defined, but at their core replicated most of the economics of banks. As
such, they were subject to instabilities similar to those banks face-those
holding short term debt became nervous and started to pull out, leading
to panicked sales of assets to meet those calls on debt, and a downward
spiral of deleveraging. Poor compensation systems and the implied
insurance provided by the likelihood of government bailouts made
market participants more willing to take on risk, although I believe even
without these incentive problems a crisis would have happened. The
natural human tendencies to forget about what went wrong to inspire the
previous crisis and to follow the herd in seeking high profits were the
core problems.
How can we prevent this from recurring? Or rather, how can we
delay the next crisis and make it less severe when it does occur? Some
would have us combine further deregulation and the removal of
government from the relevant markets with a strong commitment to no
more bailouts.'5 5  That is the extreme Hayek solution. It has some
support within the general cowardly interventionist framework. As we
154. See, e.g., Maya Jackson Randall, GOP Senators Weigh Fresh Angles to Rein in
Dodd-Frank, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527
02304259304576376040466031226.html.
155. See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, Dissenting Statement to FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY




have seen, where an intervention has major unintended consequences, we
should consider eliminating it. The suspect intervention here is the
government's willingness to rescue failing financial companies, which
has created serious moral hazards. Perhaps we should end rescues,
which in turn would end the need for extensive oversight and regulation
of financial markets.
Such a solution has many attractions but also a major blemish: It
won't work. There are two main reasons. First, a commitment to no
future bailouts is simply not credible.156 The political power of the
financial industry and the horrible consequences of financial collapse for
the whole economy are such that if we do reach a crisis point, any
government with even a passing interest in staying in power will engage
in a bailout. I suspect that fact is very, very obvious to everyone in the
financial industry. Second, although a credible commitment to no
bailouts (if possible) would indeed reduce non-optimal risk taking by
financial institutions, it would not eliminate excessive risk taking as a
whole. The sorts of risk externalities (contagion), poor internal
incentives, and cognitive failures described in part II would still
permeate financial markets and still lead to crises. Given how much pain
those crises would cause, it is not acceptable to say that it is just the price
we pay for our capitalist system. In short, government intervention in
financial markets is here to stay. The history of financial crises and
regulatory responses strongly supports that conclusion.
If stronger regulation is the better strategy, what should it look like?
I would classify the appropriate response into three parts. First, we need
a core regulatory structure that addresses the shadow banking world.
Second, we could use a series of more limited new rules that address the
most serious specific problems that exacerbated the recent crisis. Third,
our regulatory architecture should have a prominent place for persons
who focus on constantly scrutinizing the markets and their regulators for
ways in which current rules do not appropriately respond to emerging
market conditions. Let us consider each element in turn.
1. Addressing Shadow Banking
There are two different paths within our framework to get at what
the core structure for regulating shadow banking should look like. The
conservative path proceeds from looking at existing and past regulation,
while the Keynesian path proceeds more from first principles. Consider
first the conservative path. Clers look for as simple and basic a structure
156. Even a prescient pre-crisis warning about the dangers of too big to fail banks,
which argues for limiting future bailouts, stresses that committing to no bailouts under
any circumstances is not credible.
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as possible, one with a proven track record or at least relatively close
antecedents to which markets can adapt. We have such a structure with
the New Deal financial regulations, which put in place the calmest half-
century American financial markets ever experienced. There were
several main features to New Deal banking regulation.157 FDIC insured
depositors, preventing runs and contagions. If depositors are protected
by the FDIC, they need not fear a bank's failure, and hence need not rush
to remove their money. With the FDIC came a need to quickly and
effectively dispose of banks that did fail. The resolution process
punished shareholders and managers of failed banks, providing effective
deterrence. Increased bank supervision and regulation, particularly
capital requirements, addressed the moral hazard problem that deposit
insurance created.
What is needed is a way to generalize these solutions to our more
complicated present world while not eliminating the wide variety of
financial instruments, institutions, and markets that have appeared in
recent decades (although we may have to prune that variety somewhat).
Thus, the core structural reform ideally would apply a variant of the New
Deal regime beyond banks to shadow banking institutions. All
institutions that are enough like banks to face the basic problems of
banks would have the Federal Reserve (or some other agency) as a lender
of last resort, but in return should be subject to rules governing basic
soundness. The rules applied would, at least at their core, be relatively
simple-above all, capital requirements and/or leverage limits plus
resolution authority for failed companies.
We can come to the same conclusion via a different path that goes
through Keynes and Minsky. The key problem is the tendency of booms
and busts within unstable financial markets. We want to stop panics.
The most straightforward way to stop panics, one with a very long
historical pedigree, is for the government to step in and rescue enough
institutions and/or investors to stop the panic. 5 8 But these rescues have a
large unintended consequence, one Minsky highlights. The prospect of
rescue induces financial institutions to take on too much risk, with
increases in leverage, speculation, and financial innovation leading to
157. See generally ELLEN D. RUSSELL, NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS AND KEYNESIAN
WELFARE STATE CAPITALISM (Richard McIntyre ed., 2008). Beyond the reforms
mentioned in the text, the post-War banking regulatory regime also contained more
stringent limits that look quite draconian today, including usury limits, limits on inter-
state banking, and strict limits on entry and the creation of new financial products. A
very hard question is to what extent the post-War market stability depended upon those
restrictive regulations. In an instance of bald cowardice, I have buried that question in a
footnote.
158. See sources cited supra note 53, on the importance of a lender of last resort as a
response to systemic risk.
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inflationary booms once the discipline of likely busts is taken away.
Hayek's response is to foreswear the rescues, but I have already argued
that this response is neither politically feasible nor wise. So, if we are
going to do rescues, our framework suggests that we should do what we
can to replicate the kinds of discipline that the market would provide in
the absence of such interventions.159
The New Deal banking framework does this in two main ways.
First, resolution authority imposes discipline on the core decision-makers
of failed and rescued institutions. If top officers and equity investors of
such institutions know that they are likely to lose their jobs or their
investments in the event of a government bailout, then these officers and
investors will have a strong incentive to avoid taking on risks that may
lead to a bailout. Thus, such a resolution authority closely mimics the
incentives those persons would face in the market without the prospect of
rescue. Second, in the absence of rescue, financial institutions have
incentive to build up a strong capital cushion, both to reduce the prospect
of bankruptcy and also to reassure creditors. The prospect of bailouts
eliminates or greatly reduces the market discipline that comes from
creditors, and thus we would expect to see lower capital cushions. The
evidence supports this expectation.160 The government can try to correct
this by imposing capital requirements that would reduce the amount of
risky leverage and speculation in which protected institutions can
engage, and also provide more of a cushion for when the markets turn
down, reducing the chances that the regulated institutions will need to be
rescued.
Thus, two core arguments within our framework suggest that we use
the New Deal's banking framework as a template for shadow bank
regulation. We shall see that the Dodd-Frank Act's most important
provisions go pretty far in following this template. But there is a big
problem with my prescription: we do not have a good way to define
which companies are shadow banks that should fall within the system's
protection and regulation, nor do we have definitions of capital and
leverage that adequately reflect all the various ways that companies can
take on leverage and liquidity mismatches in today's complex financial
world. In the next Part, I shall criticize the Act and worry mightily that
its failure to extend its rules to enough of the shadow banking world will
play a big role in bringing about the next crisis. But I will not have any
good alternative schemes to offer-this problem is very hard indeed.
Some have argued that we should clearly delineate which
companies will be regulated as banks, greatly restricting their activities
159. See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, at 411, 712.
160. See supra note 31.
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but granting them access to lender of last resort protection.' 6 1 Companies
outside this (necessarily somewhat arbitrary) definition would be allowed
to operate with only light regulation, but would also be allowed to fail
without rescue. This suggestion has many positives, and the Dodd-Frank
Act seems to be trying to do something similar. But there is a big
problem: any arbitrary definition we use may very well wind up leaving
out institutions, or classes of institutions, which individually or
collectively come to pose a systemic risk that we do not anticipate and
realize only as the institutions fail. At that point, the commitment to not
rescue will be set aside. But companies know this, and hence the moral
hazard problem remains with no regulation to correct it.
2. Addressing Other Old Problems
Beyond addressing the core structural issues of shadow banking, we
should also address some of the more specific problems that led to the
crisis, including manipulative mortgages, the moral hazard of
securitization, credit rating agencies that performed poorly, and the
unexpected systemic risk created by complex derivatives. These rules
should be more specific than the general prudential scheme for shadow
banking, and should attempt to stop practices that have been shown to
cause specific harms. The rules should be limited in scope, limiting
market activity as little as possible, and, to the extent possible, modeled
upon other rules that have already had some demonstrable success. It
may be argued that these rules would involve protecting against the
causes of the past crisis rather than what is likely to lead to the next
crisis. This argument is true-and the next suggestion tries to address
future problems-but if we do not correct the specific problems that led
to the last crisis, those same problems are likely to play a role in future
crises.162
Where past governmental interventions have caused problems, we
should consider eliminating or greatly modifying them. Current
examples of where Clers should be willing to make such modifications
are the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
3. Addressing Future Problems
Finally, we need to recognize that the financial system will
constantly evolve, and our rules need to evolve with it.' 63 Also, as we
161. See, e.g., Sankarshan Acharya, Safe Banking, 3 J. AM. ACAD. Bus. 247 (2003),
available at http://www.pro-prosperity.com/usa/safe%20Banking.pdf




implement new rules, we should evaluate them and change or eliminate
those that do not appear to be working as planned. Thus, a strong
regulatory system should have in place people who are constantly
monitoring that system's effectiveness and asking questions about what
regulators could and should be doing differently. We need to recognize
our limits as regulators and build in structures to handle these limitations
as much as possible-always realizing that this is a Sisyphean task that
can never fully succeed.
Has the Dodd-Frank Act done all of this effectively? That is the
question for our next section.
VI. DODD-FRANK AS COWARDLY INTERVENTION
The answer to our question is yes. On balance, the Dodd-Frank Act
consists of a series of plausible cowardly interventions in the face of the
problems that the crisis has revealed. It is an ambitious act-famously
over 2,000 pages long and with thousands of pages in administrative
rules and studies to follow. But as we shall see, each major part of the
Act is plausibly rooted in existing regulation, responds to real problems,
and is not at all radical. There are, however, some important gaps that
will still need to be addressed. And we should be prepared to cut back
on elements in the Act that upon implementation prove to cause more
problems than they solve. Let us consider how well the Dodd-Frank Act
handles the three broad areas for reform identified above: regulating
shadow banking, addressing other past problems, and addressing future
problems.
A. Regulating Shadow Banking
I have argued that Clers should support regulating shadow banking
by applying the New Deal banking regulation template. This involves
three main elements: insurance or lender of last resort rescues, resolution
authority, and basic prudential regulation (mainly capital requirements).
1. Insurance
One main element of the New Deal banking regulatory structure
was FDIC insurance, which has largely ended traditional bank runs. The
Dodd-Frank Act provides no such explicit insurance. Indeed, at various
points the Act attempts to disavow expectations of government bailouts.
Yet after the events of 2008, those disavowals are surely unbelievable.
The government would have to go to extreme lengths to prevent itself
from engaging in bailouts for any such disavowal to be worth notice, and
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nothing in the Act does so. Indeed, it is far from clear how the
government could effectively commit to no bailouts.
Thus, as a matter of well-understood fact if not explicit law,
everyone now expects the federal government to bail out failing financial
institutions where collapse of the financial system looms. That should go
a long way to avoiding runs. 164 It is true that there is some uncertainty as
to when the government will step in-the bailouts did prove extremely
unpopular, which will make future politicians loath to repeat the
experience, and after all Lehman Brothers was not rescued. Some argue
that this sort of probabilistic insurance actually makes a lot of sense. The
likelihood of a bailout helps reduce the chance of runs, while the
possibility that a bailout will not occur for some institutions helps reduce
the moral hazard to take on too much risk. 165 This implicit insurance or
guarantee should appeal to Clers because there are no complicated new
rules or institutions, simply a tacit recognition that governments will
continue to behave as they have long behaved when crises occur.
The funding for future bailouts, however, could have been better
arranged. The Obama Administration proposed creating a fund through
a tax on financial institutions to pay for future rescues. This was
removed in Congress out of fear that it would make bailouts more likely.
While that fear is not unfounded, funding bailouts through such a tax
could be very helpful if the tax could be made to depend upon the degree
of systemic risk particular institutions are creating. Such a funding
mechanism, similar to what the FDIC does for banks, would have helped
to reduce the systemic risk externality. 166
Another concern is that several of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions
either limit the authority of the Federal Reserve to engage in certain
actions it used for bailouts in the crisis, or require the support of other
regulators before engaging in certain bailout activities.167 The
prohibition on certain activities is indeed a concern, although the Federal
Reserve is likely creative enough, and has enough remaining power, that
it will probably be able to find a way to do what is needed. Requiring
164. Schwarcz has emphasized the importance of having a lender of last resort to
prevent runs within a complex system. See Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in
Financial Markets, supra note 53, at 247-56.
165. Some have even argued that in light of this general, if probabilistic, guarantee,
the specific legal insurance of FDIC should be eliminated, so that banks do not get
special treatment. RAJAN, supra note 7, at 178-80. That strikes me as a dangerous
suggestion-FDIC was one of the most successful regulatory innovations in the history
of American finance, and has continued to work very well. In an area where well-
functioning laws are hard to devise and ultimately tend to become obsolete, it seems
foolish to get rid of one that has worked so well for so long.
166. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, at 47, 218-19.
167. Id. at 222.
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approval from other regulators is less bothersome. It provides a bit of a
brake, which may be helpful in discouraging needless bailouts. Should a
genuine need arise, however, it is hard to imagine that other regulators
will prevent the Federal Reserve from acting.
2. Resolution Authority
Even if other regulations help reduce the chances of future crises,
crises will happen. Regulators need to be able to step in and deal quickly
with failing institutions when they come. Since the advent of the New
Deal, the FDIC has been able to do that with traditional commercial
banks. But in the recent crisis many troubled institutions were not banks
covered by the FDIC. Regulators did not have adequate tools to deal
with these institutions, and thus resorted to bailouts which were in some
cases more generous than they should have been. Not only were these
bailouts widely, and correctly, seen as unfair, but they also worsened the
moral hazard problem for the future.
The Dodd-Frank Act extends a new resolution authority to non-
bank financial institutions that are deemed to pose a systemic risk to the
financial system and the economy. 6 8 The terms of that authority largely
mimic both bankruptcy and FDIC resolution authority, and put power
over systemically risky failing financial institutions in the hands of the
FDIC. Thus, this is not some wild new power, but rather an extension of
existing, well-established approaches just as Clers recommend.
Importantly, the Act dictates that shareholders will lose all 69 and
managers will also lose out, losing their jobs 7 0 and facing possible
clawbacks.17 1 This gives strong incentives for managers and
shareholders to want to avoid the resolution process. The treatment of
secured creditors is less clear-will they face haircuts, in which they lose
some of their investment? Haircuts run the risk of inducing runs, but
also add some further discipline to the system, giving creditors incentives
to better monitor financial institutions. The Act punts on this point,
mandating a study on creditor haircuts.17 2 We shall see that such punting
is a common, and defensible, strategy in the Act.
168. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 201-17, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-520 (2010).
169. See id. at §§ 204(a)(1), 206(2).
170. See id. at §§ 204(a)(2), 206(4).
171. See id. at § § 204(a)(3), 2 10(s). Clawbacks take back compensation already paid.
172. See id at § 215. Most likely the best approach is an intermediate one-
punishing unsecured creditors enough that it creates some discipline, but not too much, so
as to limit the risk of a panic. Thus, the haircut should be somewhere between hippy and
a crew cut.
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Much depends upon how aggressive regulators are in determining
which companies are systemically risky. For the resolution authority to
apply, the FDIC and the Federal Reserve must make a recommendation
to the Secretary of the Treasury, who then determines if use of the
authority is appropriate for a particular company. 173 We have seen that
the shadow banking system is quite widespread. In some markets, the
aggregated behavior of many relatively small companies acting similarly
can add up to serious risk to the whole financial system and may lead to
a need to take over many such companies during a crisis. Indeed, as
noted in Part II, that is what happened with banks during the Great
Depression. Will the regulators limit coverage of this resolution
authority only to a few very large, inter-connected companies, or will
they go further and recognize the risk that even relatively modest
companies may create when they are part of a market that is similarly
situated, and all face collapse at the same time? The answer to this
question will help determine how far the Dodd-Frank Act in fact goes in
addressing the shadow banking system.
Another tension here is that the definition of companies covered by
this resolution authority is vague, thus vesting a lot of discretion with the
regulators. That is problematic from a Hayekian point of view. And yet,
the difficulty of clearly identifying those companies that we should want
to cover, and the rapidly changing circumstances which are likely to
change our understanding of that question over time, argues for keeping
a fairly vague standard and allowing regulators room to exercise
judgment. The statutory language provides some guidance, 174 and
implementing regulations can hopefully add some clarity.
A number of commentators have argued that we would be better off
using a modified version of chapter 11 bankruptcy rather than a new
resolution authority. These commentators argue that chapter 11 is well
established and clear, with procedural protections for creditors. It has
more rule of law virtues than the new authority, which vests much
discretion in the FDIC.175  But there are significant problems with
173. See id at § 203(a), (b).
174. The Secretary of the Treasury must consider seven items in determining that a
company shall be subject to the new resolution authority: the company is in default or in
danger of default; the company's failure "would have serious adverse effects on financial
stability"; no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent default; the effect on
creditors; resolution would mitigate such effects on credits; an agency has ordered the
company to convert all of its convertible debt instruments; and the company satisfies the
definition of a financial company. Id. at § 203(b).
175. See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, at 213-40; DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW
FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES 129-52 (2010); Stephen J. Lubben, Systemic Risk and Chapter 11, 82
TEMP. L. REv. 433 (2009).
50 [Vol. 116:1
DON'T PANIC!
applying chapter 11 to financial institutions in the midst of a panic. Most
importantly, speed is of the essence during a panic, and courts are not
known for their speed. Also, financial institutions are complex entities
within a complex system, and their resolution requires an expert hand
that understands the individual company and is also acting with the
interests of the entire system in mind. 17 6 Moreover, the discretionary
authority to invoke an alternative resolution regime will give the
government important bargaining power during the next crisis that it
lacked in 2008.
Either an FDIC-based system or chapter 11 could be modified to
meet some objections. Chapter 11 would probably need to change a
variety of specific rules to meet the specific needs of financial
institutions."' Special masters could be used to provide financial
expertise, and banking regulators could be given the power to commence
chapter 11 proceedings under specified circumstances. Similarly, the
new FDIC-based resolution authority could be modified to give it more
predictability. The financial regulators could establish rules giving
guidance regarding when they will invoke the new resolution authority.
Other rules could make the new procedure look more like chapter 11
(which it already resembles in many ways).'7 8  Indeed, after such
modifications, the two alternatives look similar.
A Hayekian libertarian should prefer chapter 11 and its rule of law
virtues. A Keynesian liberal should prefer the new resolution authority,
with its greater powers and nimbleness to respond to market panics. An
Oakeshottian conservative can find things to admire in both-the
Bankruptcy Code is a longstanding traditional institution (at least in
broad outline), but the FDIC resolution authority for banks on which the
Dodd-Frank Act's authority is patterned is also well-established by now
and has proven very successful. On balance, I lean towards the Dodd-
Frank Act's approach over chapter 11 for financial institutions, mainly
because of the need for extreme speed during a crisis.
3. Regulating Systemically Risky Companies
The New Deal banking regulations (not to mention Minsky and
Hayek) teach us that with the promise of insurance or a bailout comes the
need for increased regulation and supervision. The promise of rescue
176. Morrison, Edward R., Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for
Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REv. 449
(2009).
177. See ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, 213-40; Lubben, supra note 175; SKEEL,
supra note 175, at 129-52.
178. Stephen J. Lubben, Financial Institutions in Bankruptcy, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv.
1259 (2011).
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when things go badly creates moral hazard as companies take on too
much risk. Regulation of banks subject to the FDIC guarantees both
limits to risky activities and requires banks to limit leverage and retain a
capital cushion which hopefully will save the bank during hard times.
Since we have now extended an implicit guarantee to some companies in
the shadow banking world, we need to extend such regulation and
supervision as well. 7 9
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council
(Council) composed of the heads of the leading financial regulatory
agencies. so The Council has authority to supervise and regulate
nonbank financial companies that it deems to pose systemic risk.' 8 ' This
involves supervision similar to that of banks, and imposing prudential
standards, most importantly capital requirements.1 82 Working within
existing regulatory agencies and imposing rules already familiar in
banking regulation puts this new authority well within the Cler camp.
Much obviously depends upon the stringency of the standards and
supervision imposed, but I am more concerned with which institutions
the Council chooses to regulate. The point is very close to that raised
above for the resolution authority. Systemic risk can arise just as well
from many modestly sized companies in a market behaving similarly as
from a few giants.183 If the Council limits its attention only to the latter,
it will miss out on much of the shadow banking world. But if it
interprets its authority more broadly, then the Act will be a major
positive step in regulating shadow banking. Here, too, the balance
between precise rules and vague standards is tricky.
Hedge funds are an important part of shadow banking. One section
of the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on hedge funds and their advisers.184 The
Act does not give authority for any significant substantive regulation of
hedge funds or their advisers, but it does require hedge funds and their
advisers to provide extensive new disclosures to regulators.' 8 5 This will
give regulators more information as to what is going on in an important
part of the modem financial world, and will at least give them a better
chance of identifying new risks. Disclosure requirements are a modest,
familiar, and hence appropriately cowardly strategy.
Some of the key regulatory safeguards are capital requirements,
which create a safety cushion and limit the degree of risky leverage
179. See infra notes 186 through 191 and accompanying text.
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 111.
181. Id. § 113.
182. Id.
183. RouBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 213; RAIAN, supra note 7, at 171.
184. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, §§ 501-42.
185. Id. §§ 403-05.
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regulated companies may undertake. The Dodd-Frank Act makes some
improvements in capital requirements, but it leaves most details to
regulators domestic and foreign. As already mentioned, the Act extends
regulation, including capital requirements, to a broader set of companies
with the inclusion of systemically important non-bank financial
companies. The Act also urges regulators to set counter-cyclical capital
requirements.18 6 This is important because we want to force companies
to pull back as bubbles start to take hold while not overly restricting
them during times of crisis when reluctance to advance credit feeds the
crisis.' 87  The natural tendency of regulators is like the regulated,
however: pro-cyclical-falling asleep at the switch when the market is
booming, and becoming too vigilant when crises reveal problems. The
big question mark is how to make regulators effectively implement
counter-cyclical capital requirements. As with so many things, the Act
leaves the answer to that question to future regulations."' The Act
consigns to a study an ingenious suggestion to force financial companies
to issue contingent debt which would convert to equity when the
company neared insolvency.189  This would provide an automatic
stabilizer that creates more equity capital when needed, and the market
price for such debt would indicate what market participants believe
concerning the health of the company. There is a serious question
whether markets for such debt would actually develop, however-would
anyone want to hold it? This is an intriguing idea, but probably one that
needs more study-and that is what Congress has done, showing due
caution while recognizing a potentially useful regulatory innovation.
The Act does not set clear, bright-line capital requirements, instead
leaving the details to regulators.190 The problem is quite deep-with
modern financial and accounting practices, evaluating the nature and risk
of different kinds of capital is exceedingly difficult.' 9' This problem is
best left to regulators rather than members of Congress, but even the
former will find this a deep challenge-ultimately one that is bound to
partially defeat them. In the area of capital requirements, the most
important rulemaking is occurring at the international level, as the Basel
186. Id. § 616.
187. See ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 206; Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical
Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. REG. 1 (2008).
188. For an interesting analysis which draws upon a framework called Imperfect
Knowledge Economics, stressing the futility of attempting to precisely predict economic
variables, see Roman Frydman & Michael D. Goldberg, Financial Markets and the State:
Long Swings, Risk, and the Scope of Regulation, 4 CAPITALISM & Soc'Y (2009),
available at http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol4/iss2/art2.
189. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act §§ 115, 163.
190. Id. §§ 115, 121, 165, 171; Id. §# 606, 616.
191. SKEEL, supra note 175, at 82-83.
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Committee on Banking Supervision moves to finalize the Basel III
Accords. I will discuss this a bit more below when I turn to international
cooperation in financial regulation. A further innovation regulators
should consider is regular usage of stress tests.' 92
Given the important role of illiquidity in bank-like panics,
regulators might also usefully consider whether and how to impose
liquidity requirements upon investments by banks and bank-like entities.
That task is daunting and possibly infeasible, however. As the latest
crisis demonstrated, assets may be subject to markets that look decently
liquid during good times but that prove illiquid when most needed in a
panic. How to predict in advance which markets will become illiquid is
quite unclear.
B. Addressing Problems from the Past Crisis
I believe that the portions of the Dodd-Frank Act mentioned above
are its most important provisions. It is these provisions that go closest to
the core of shadow banking, and begin to extend the regulatory net to the
new world of non-bank financial companies. But beyond the general
characteristics of shadow banking, we saw in Part II some particular
problems that also helped to cause the crisis. These problems arose at
various links in the securitization chain. Addressing these problems is
more a matter of plugging the specific holes exposed by the last crisis
than focusing on the grand architecture of the financial system. Still, if
we do not plug the holes that leaked in 2008, they are likely to continue
leaking, so these reforms matter as well, and they take up a large portion
of the Act. Clers want to mend securitization, not end it, and that is what
the Act tries to do.
1. Consumer Financial Products
Many mortgages, particularly sub-prime and Alt A mortgages, were
abusive, with terms that took advantage of unsophisticated buyers.
Exactly what proportion were abusive is a matter of heated debate,
because some characteristics that are termed abusive are defensible as
clever ways to make credit for buying houses available to persons who
would not otherwise be credit-worthy.19 3  Still, few deny that at least
some practices were wrong. Protecting consumers from such practices is
important as a matter of consumer protection. But is it also defensible as
a way to protect the soundness of the financial system? Some argue that
the two goals are in conflict. After all, consumer protection measures
192. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, at 23.
193. See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 7, at 74-81.
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undermine the profitability of financial companies, and lower profits may
endanger the health of those companies.
While this may be so, the profits from abusive practices come
mainly during financial bubbles, and these profits further inflate those
bubbles. When the bubbles burst, the abusive practices may collapse and
cause problems for their makers. Thus, some have argued that consumer
advocates who warned about abusive financial practices had early
insights into the existence of the housing bubble. Financiat regulators
should have listened.'94
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a new Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (Bureau) to focus on practices that take advantage of
consumers.' 95 The Bureau is located within the Federal Reserve, but
given much independence. This was one of the most controversial parts
of the Act, and it comes with danger. The Bureau could go too far in
discouraging valuable financial innovation. As noted, in some cases its
mission may conflict with preserving the soundness of financial
institutions, though much more often I think the two goals are
complementary. There are always dangers when creating new
bureaucracies: who knows in which direction they will head (industry
capture? over-regulation to glorify themselves?), and once established
they are very hard to eliminate, even if they create more costs than
benefits. And it is not as if the already-crowded world of federal
financial regulatory agencies was clearly in need of one more agency
with its own agenda. Moreover, the Act vests much discretion in this
new Bureau-always a red, or at least yellow, flag signaling the need for
great caution before proceeding. And yet, given both the demonstrated
need for more consumer protection with respect to financial products,
and even more importantly the role that abusive products can play in
destabilizing the financial system, on balance having an agency
dedicated to this task is probably a good move.' 9 6 For me, the most
decisive argument for the Bureau is that it could prove an important
counter to the industry capture which always threatens to dilute financial
regulation. Wall Street's fear of Elizabeth Warren is precisely why she
should be appointed to head the Bureau. Clers should be anxious as to
how the new Bureau will behave, but all in all thankful that it was
created. This is perhaps the most questionable major element of the Act,
194. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in
Financial Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279 (2009); Erik F. Gerding, The Subprime Crisis
and the Link Betveen Consumer Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 4 FLA. INT'L U.
L. REV. 435 (2009).
195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act §§ 1001-99.
196. See Elizabeth Warren & Oren Bar-Gill, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (2008).
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and it may turn out to have been a mistake. On balance, however, this
Bureau appears advisable.
2. More Skin in the Securitization Game
There was a significant incentive problem within the mortgage
securitization system. Mortgage originators who planned to quickly
securitize had reduced incentive to ensure the quality of those mortgages.
This problem would have been reduced if investors in the securitized
interests had been adequately aware of the problem and had monitored
that risk. But they weren't and they didn't, so securitization helped lead
to an increase in mortgage default risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act may reduce this problem. It requires the
securitizers of most asset-backed securities to retain at least five percent
of the credit risk of the securities they sell.197 With this skin in the game,
there exists more incentive to ensure that underwriting standards are
adequate. The requirement is waived for certain vanilla types of
mortgages,198 increasing the incentive to offer those types of less risky
mortgages. This requirement is modest and is one of the clearest and
most precise parts of the Act, and it appears well-targeted at the source of
the incentive problem. Therefore, it is an appropriately cowardly
intervention. It may be too modest-many MBS sellers did retain
significant amounts of skin and still came a cropper, so the 5%
requirement may not actually solve the problem. But it may help, and at
any rate appears unlikely to cause harm.1 99
3. Credit Rating Agencies
Credit rating agencies also helped to cause the securitization mess,
with ratings that at least in retrospect were often too optimistic. The
Dodd-Frank Act takes some significant steps to address the problem.
Perhaps most importantly, it requires agencies to stop their regulatory
reliance on ratings. 200 Frank Partnoy has argued that a leading reason for
the heavy dependence of markets on ratings has been regulatory
arbitrage. Some major institutional investors are required to limit their
investments to highly rated products. The ratings agencies are thus in
effect selling a license to invest for these firms. 20 1 The Act should end
this reality. Here is an example of a major harmful unintended
197. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 941.
198. Id. at § 944.
199. A caveat: if this requirement causes lawyers to balk at issuing "true sale"
opinions, it could cause serious problems for the securitization markets.
200. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act §§ 939, 939A.
201. See Partnoy, supra note 32.
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consequence of past rules, and the Act does as it should: namely, it
eliminates those rules.
The Act also exposes credit rating agencies to a greater risk of
securities fraud liability. 20 2 The Act forces more public disclosure by
ratings agencieS203 and imposes qualification standards on credit rating
analysts.204 These efforts to increase transparency in the securities
market are a traditional approach within U.S. security regulation. This
transparency is intended to help financial markets function more
efficiently. Both of these features are highly desirable to Clers.2 0 5 The
Act does not take on the issuer-pays model of financing ratings agencies,
which creates troubling conflicts of interests. It does not do so in part
because no one has yet come up with a convincing alternative financial
model. Instead, this is another area that the Act consigns to further
study.206 Given the importance but thorniness of the issue, and the
current lack of a good alternative, that seems about the best that can be
done. Thus, the Act takes a variety of plausible steps aimed at some of
the problems underlying ratings agencies, while deferring for study other
problems for which we do not yet have a solution. Clers should approve,
although directing regulators to stop using credit ratings is a risky move,
because it is not at all clear that regulators have better measures to use in
their place.
4. Derivative Clearinghouses
Credit swaps and other derivatives used in asset-backed securities
markets also helped to create systemic risk through counter-party risk.
The lack of transparency was a major part of the problem: no one knew
which major financial institutions were in trouble from this source of
risk, and this led to a bank run-like panic on many institutions.
The Dodd-Frank Act puts in place an attempted solution to this
problem that has been widely discussed in the aftermath of the crisis. 20 7
Most swaps and similar derivatives must now go through regulated
clearinghouses, and even most of those which do not must still be
publicly reported.208 It is hoped that this will do several things. It will
202. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 933.
203. Id. at § 932.
204. Id. at § 936.
205. But Clers should also expect the kinds of unintended consequences that those
traditional methods have created. For instance, expect to see ratings agencies charge
more for their services now that they are subject to securities liability.
206. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 939D.
207. For a discussion, including some criticism of the approach taken in Dodd-Frank,
see Zach Gubler, Regulating the Financial innovation Process, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011).
208. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act §§ 701-74.
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increase transparency, so that we know where such risks lie-as
previously noted, increased transparency is a traditional and market-
friendly regulatory strategy. The clearinghouses should also help reduce
systemic risk by reducing counterparty risk. The clearinghouses
themselves guarantee payment, so that if the original party does not pay,
payment will still be made. To protect against having to do this, the
clearinghouses will impose margin requirements and other safeguards to
decrease the likelihood of defaults. The various private actors that are
part of these clearinghouses have some incentive to monitor the
clearinghouses to ensure that they are doing an adequate job with these
safeguards.
There is a potential catch here: the clearinghouses themselves could
become potential sources of systemic risk. If they do not adequately
anticipate and price the risk of many parties getting into financial trouble
at once, the clearinghouses could face collapse and possibly would need
to be rescued. The prospect of such a bailout may indeed cause the
clearinghouses to do too little to avoid such risk. The Act recognizes this
problem and directs regulators to impose standards to guard against this
risk.209 One hopes that will be enough, but one worries it will not be.
Still, on balance, the clearinghouses seem a worthwhile innovation.
They are an attempt to work with and buttress markets rather than
eliminate them: a properly cowardly innovation.2 10
5. Corporate Governance
Corporate governance and compensation practices within many
financial institutions have also been blamed for the crisis. Various
practices may have encouraged too much risk-taking, as those taking the
risks gained a lot but did not bear the costs when investments failed. In
Part II, I suggested that this was not one of the most significant causes
for the crisis, but it was partially responsible.
The Dodd-Frank Act has a variety of measures aimed at corporate
211
governance. Some of these are aimed at all public corporations.
209. Id. §§ 804-05.
210. I meant to write "cowardly intervention" here, but I like the mistake. Another
unintended consequence of the clearinghouses is that they may limit entry and enforce
oligopolies. See Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Trading in Derivatives,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, at Al.
211. Stephen Bainbridge rightly asks why these reforms aim at all public corporations
following a crisis within the financial sector. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:
Quack Corporate Governance Round 11, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011). It is a very good
question, but excessive risk by companies outside the financial sector may have
contributed to making the economy more vulnerable to a sharp downturn once the credit
cycle swung down, as indebted companies struggled to pay debts and cut back on
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These include advisory "Say on Pay" votes on executive
compensation.212 Evidence from the UK, which adopted Say on Pay in
2004, suggests this will do both little harm and little good.213 Indeed,
doing little harm and little good probably describes most of the Act's
corporate governance provisions. The Act does authorize the SEC to
institute rules granting certain shareholders proxy access so that they
may use corporate proxy statements to nominate board of director
candidates. 2 14  The SEC very quickly acted on this authority. 2 15  In
general, proxy access is a useful accountability device, although the
SEC's rule errs by setting a mandatory floor which shareholders cannot
alter to make less generous. 2 16 But I doubt this has much to do with the
risk of a future financial crisis. Indeed, given that shareholders tend to
like risk too much due to limited liability, it is not necessarily true that
we want financial company managers to be more responsive to
shareholders.
Perhaps the best corporate governance regulatory development in
the wake of the crisis has occurred outside of the Dodd-Frank Act, as the
banking regulators have reviewed compensation practices, issued
guidelines, and are now taking such practices into account in evaluating
the riskiness of financial companies.217 Insofar as compensation
practices, at both CEO and trader levels, encouraged too much risk,
compensation is clearly something that bank examiners should review.
Since examiners cannot directly determine and evaluate all risks
themselves, they should consider the incentives of those making
decisions at the bank. If those decision-makers have incentive to take on
substantial risk, the examiners should assume that they will act on those
incentives, even if the examiners cannot themselves observe all of the
resulting increased risk. Many have proposed more specific and
extensive executive compensation reforms, but past reform attempts in
expenditures. Or, it may be that the corporate governance reforms are plausible laws on
other grounds, even if they have little to do with the financial crisis.
212. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 951.
213. Fabrizio Ferri & D. Maber, Say On Pay Votes and CEO Compensation:
Evidence from the UK (March 11, 2011) (working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1420394.
214. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 971.
215. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
9136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Aug. 25, 2010). The new rules have since been stayed in
response to a lawsuit. Business Roundtable, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9149 (Oct. 4,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9149.pdf.
216. Brett McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Proxy Access, 43 ARIz. ST. L.J. 67
(2011).
217. Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, FDIC Issue Final Guidance on Incentive
Compensation, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (June 21,
2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bereg/20100621 a.htm.
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this area have been subject to severe unintended consequences such that
cowardice seems wise. The supervision process may give a way of
nudging companies toward better practices, however. A Hayekian
concern is that this gives too much discretionary power to bank
supervisors. But discretionary power for bank supervisors is an old, and
hence conservative, phenomenon. To provide more predictability and
guidance, regulators could list certain practices as good and others as
bad, giving companies notice as to how their compensation systems will
affect their regulatory burden.
C. Addressing Future Problems: Studies, Reports, Rulemaking, and
Contrarians
As we have already seen at several points in our whirlwind tour of
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Act leaves much discretion for future agency
regulation. Even where the Act does take specific positions, it generally
does so only by putting in place a broad framework with directions to the
relevant agency to write rules. On a number of matters, the Act does not
take any position at all, but rather directs agencies to conduct studies and
decide what to do after examining the results of those studies. One
analysis found that the Act dictates 243 new rulemakings, 67 studies, and
22 periodic reports.2 18
Many of the Act's critics are concerned by the uncertainty all of this
creates. Some argue that the uncertainty is keeping businesses from
investing, and thus lengthening the recession. 2 19 That does seem quite
possible. And yet, what else was Congress to do? Most of the studies
and rules concern areas where there are real problems, and where the
answers to those problems are far from clear. Congress could have
delayed making rules until it was ready to engage in more detailed
rulemaking itself, but that would have meant even more uncertainty and
would have risked nothing being done as political will diminished and
the crisis receded from view. Perhaps Congress could have just ignored
the many problems where it had no detailed answers available, but that
would have meant not addressing dozens of very real and serious
problems. Further, maybe Congress could have written more detailed
rules even though it did not know what to do, but that would likely have
resulted in a number of bad rules.
218. What the Dodd Frank Act Means for the Regulators?,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (July 13, 2010), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/
2010/07/see-page-344-hooray-kirkland.html.
219. See Robert Higgs, Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So
Long and Why Prosperity Returned After the War, 1 INDEP. REv. 561 (1997).
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Indeed, if we assume that the crisis has revealed major regulatory
gaps that must be filled, then the open-textured quality of much of the
Act may well be an ingenious design. As we have seen,220 one of the
conundrums of the political economy of regulation is that both regulators
and the general public are most likely to push for strong regulation
during a crisis, but that it is during crises when strict regulations are
likely to do the most damage. Stricter regulation is best enacted when
bubbles are starting to develop, but that is the time when regulators and
the public are least inclined to regulate. The Act goes some way towards
squaring this circle. 22 1 During the crisis, when there was pressure to act,
Congress enacted major changes to the structure of financial regulation.
We now know the general contours of where this regulation is headed.
Further major changes are unlikely until the next crisis. A large amount
of uncertainty has been eliminated. But the details will emerge only over
a number of years. Regulatory uncertainty will thus continue to reduce
over time, and restrictive new rules will come online as the financial
system recovers (one hopes!). 222
There is a major fly in the ointment for this strategy, however. One
should be very worried that as time passes, the crisis recedes, and
regulators write their rules and studies, public attention will shift to other
matters and normal industry capture of the regulators will return. Will
all of these new rules become toothless?
Quite possibly, but there is at least some reason to hope that these
rules will have bite. The Dodd-Frank Act contains a variety of
mechanisms to try to keep the regulators on their toes. Various new
offices are created in the Act to inspire some independent pressure on
new regulations: the Financial Stability Oversight Council,223 an Office
of Financial Research,224 an Investor Advisory Committee225 and Office
of the Investor Advocate within the SEC,226 a new council of Inspectors
Generals of the major financial agencies,227 and the new Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection,228 which includes a Consumer Advisory
Board.2 29 Dan Schwarcz and I have argued that these new offices may
220. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
221. Though as that metaphor suggests, true success in the task is impossible.
222. The hope here refers both to the emergence of new rules and to economic
recovery. Early signs are not promising, though.
223. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-94 (2010).
224. Id. §§ 151-56.
225. Id. §911.
226. Id. § 915.
227. Id. § 989E.
228. Id. §§ 1011-18.
229. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act § 1014.
2011] 61
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
create contrarians within the agencies, which at least force attention on
problems that regulators might otherwise avoid.2 30 All those studies and
reports mean the regulators will constantly be going before Congress to
explain and defend themselves. Hopefully there will at least be a few
members of Congress who will use the opportunity to expose problems
with existing regulations.
Some of these structures may also help address one of the deepest
problems for any system that must regulate a constantly evolving and
complex system like financial markets. Financial markets are always
changing, with new innovations leading to potential new problems that
may be very hard to foresee and analyze. The temptation is always to
regulate for the last crisis rather than the next crisis. To a considerable
extent this is an inevitable consequence of the limits of human reason.
But we can at least push the regulators to try to anticipate what is coming
next. The many studies inspired by the Act may assist in this process, as
may the rulemaking processes regulators will face. Perhaps more
promising, the Office of Financial Research provides a possible locus for
sustained thinking about the future of financial regulation.2 3' The
Financial Stability Oversight Council may assist as well by requiring all
of the major regulators to meet periodically with the charge of discussing
the major current and emerging threats to the stability of America's
financial system. And note that this should not be simply a call for more
regulation. These new institutions also give a chance to reflect upon the
existing regulations that have proven unnecessary or
counterproductive.232 Thus, not only does most of the substance of the
Dodd-Frank Act consist of appropriately cowardly interventions, but at a
more structural level, with its use of contrarians, delaying tactics, and
incentives to further thought and action, the Act follows Cler strategies,
recognizing the difficulties of the problems facing regulators and striving
to build in mechanisms that keep regulators on their toes.
D. What's Missing?
The previous section concludes my quick tour of the major features
of the Dodd-Frank Act. It covers a lot, and if I am right, most of those
features are fairly sensible and should on balance do more good than
harm. Of course, I will almost certainly turn out to be wrong about some
of those features,233 and we will then face the tough task of revising or
eliminating existing rules. Ill-advised rules often become entrenched as
230. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 138.
231. Not promising, though, is how long it has taken to set up this new Office.




some parties, including the regulators themselves, benefit from the rules
and fight to protect them. Then again, the pattern of extensive financial
deregulation ever since the 1970s suggests that deregulation is certainly
possible in this area, so we are not necessarily stuck with bad new rules
forever.
But now we must ask two questions: does the whole package go
too far, or does it not go far enough? One might argue that even if each
individual element of the Act makes sense for the reasons given above,
the combination creates too much uncertainty for financial markets
during a troubled time and too many chances for unintended
consequences. The crisis revealed many major flaws in financial
markets that were the results of four decades of deregulation going back
to the nineteen-seventies as well as decades of financial innovations to
which regulators had not responded. Given the political realities of
financial regulation, any flaw left unaddressed now would not be
addressed until the next crisis. Which of the above problems would one
choose to leave festering? Surely not shadow banking-the core
provisions aimed at shadow banking are essential, even if incomplete.
Credit rating agencies? The incentives of MBS originators? The risks
spread by derivatives? Were one to insist on dropping a major element
of the Act, the leading candidate would be the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, but as argued above, on balance the Bureau
addresses a major problem. We could do without most if not all of the
corporate governance provisions of the Act, but most of these provisions
are not about financial markets, and they probably do not add
appreciably to the uncertainty created for the core part of the economy
that the Act regulates. The restriction on card-swipe fees is unlikely to
be a good idea-price controls rarely are.234
If the Act has not done too much, then how about too little? It
would not deserve the title "cowardly intervention" if some major
possible changes were not enacted. What are some of the major reforms
that have been argued for but not included? And is the Act seriously hurt
by their absence?
1. Shadow Banking
Has the Act done enough to address the core problem of the
explosion of entities that look economically like banks (taking short-term
234. There may be a real monopoly problem in the credit card industry. If so, the
better solution is not price setting, but rather a rule that allows retailers to set different
prices for different payment forms as they see fit. That way, consumers will bear the
costs of expensive payment systems, discouraging them from using them, which in turn
should encourage banks to lower fees that do not reflect costs.
2011] 63
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
debt and investing it in long term illiquid assets) but are not regulated
like banks? Addressing shadow banking is the most critical task for
regulators after the crisis. As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act extends
prudential regulation to companies designated as posing systemic risk,
and it also allows for FDIC resolution of such institutions when they fail.
Much depends upon how far regulators go in extending those
provisions. Who will count as posing risk to the stability of our financial
system? My concern is that these provisions will be reserved for only
the "too big to fail" companies. Indeed, the statutes seem to be written
only with such companies in mind. If so, many smaller companies which
collectively pose major risks will still go unregulated. That is a big
problem-the most pressing task left undone by the Act. Indeed, as a
result the Act might actually make matters worse. It imposes many new
rules upon regulated entities, and if too much of the shadow banking
system is left unregulated, the disparity could push more money into the
unregulated shadow system. That would be an awful result.235
Ideally, all companies that serve similar economic functions should
be similarly regulated. But how to put that idea, so simple in the
abstract, into practice in a detailed system of regulation is an
extraordinarily tough question. Frankly, I do not have any sort of
detailed answer available.236 I sympathize with Congress's decision to
essentially bypass this thorny question and focus more on other questions
where it had some answers. But while understandable, that approach
will not suffice in the long run. I hope that regulators will use what
powers they do have under Title I of the Act to regulate shadow banking
companies now, and when the next crisis comes I hope they will use
Title II's power to handle such companies when they fail. I am not
holding my breath.
2. Fannie and Freddie
The leading missing element decried by critics from the right is
addressing the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mess. The government created
these entities initially to encourage the mortgage industry, privatized
235. RouBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 213-14; RAJAN, supra note 7, at 161. For a
fairly similar argument which suggests a need to rather radically re-think financial
regulation, while recognizing the difficulty of doing so, see Charles K. Whitehead,
Refraining Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2010).
236. For one proposal, from two of the sharpest analysts of the crisis, see Gary B.
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, Brookings Papers on
Econ Activity, Fall 2010, at 261, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1676947. Gorton and Metrick suggest strict regulation of collateral
used in securitization and the repo market. They argue that § 120 of Dodd-Frank gives
the Financial Stability Oversight Council sufficient authority to adopt such regulations as
a response to systemic risk.
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them with an implicit government guarantee of their debt, and then took
them over when they became insolvent during the crisis. Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac are a huge part of the mortgage market. As discussed
in Part II, controversy swirls over how much blame they deserve for the
crisis. 2 37 I side with most liberals and centrists in answering that they are
not the major cause, but that they certainly contributed. What should we
do with them now? The Dodd-Frank Act does not specify.
I say eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They once served a
purpose, helping to make mortgages cheaper and develop the
securitization market. But now private institutions and markets are well
developed and capable of handling the mortgage market. Continued
government involvement simply creates moral hazard due to the implicit
guarantee of bailouts and leads to too many resources going into the
housing market.
It may have made sense to hold off acting upon Fannie and Freddie
in the Act itself. Given their huge size and central role in housing
finance, and given the current sickness of the mortgage industry, the full-
fledged privatization of Fannie and Freddie-presumably by selling off
all of their assets-will have to be slow and well-planned. The end goal,
however, should be the elimination of Fannie and Freddie as entities tied
to the federal government in any way, shape, or form. The only sort of
governmental guarantee their successors should have is the same implicit
guarantee that all major financial industry participants now have. Given
the general strategy of setting broad goals in the Dodd-Frank Act and
leaving implementation to later agency action, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac could have been eliminated by the Act. It was a failure of nerve to
not do so. Even cowardly interventions need not be quite so cowardly.
3. Too-Big-To-Fail
The biggest criticism of the Dodd-Frank Act from the left is that it
does not eliminate too-big-to-fail financial companies. 238  Similar
criticisms can come from those within more of a classical liberal
perspective, who fear a cozy relationship between big banks and
regulators. 2 3 9  The criticism is both economic and political. As to
economics, the argument is that too-big-to- fail companies cannot be
allowed to fail, and hence can almost certainly anticipate a rescue. As a
result, moral hazard is particularly severe for these companies, and they
will be encouraged to take on far too much risk, leading to privatized
237. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
238. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 153-88; STIGLITZ, supra note 7, at 164-
68; ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 226.
239. See SKEEL, supra note 175, at 83-84.
2011] 65
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
profits but socialized losses. As to politics, the argument is that a few
large financial companies have too much political influence, leading to
legislation that does too little to regulate. 24 0 These critics say we need to
legislate hard limits. Financial companies should not be allowed to grow
above a certain size, specified either in absolute dollar figures or tied to
the size of the economy.
But there are counter-arguments to both these economic and
political arguments. As to economics, we have seen that systemic risk
can just as well come from many smaller companies in a market as from
a few big ones. Moreover, size may actually reduce risk. With size
often comes diversification, such that big financial companies may find
that even as some parts of their business go bad, other parts do well
enough to stay afloat.2 41  The many atomized banks of the Great
Depression era seem to have increased instability, for instance. It is a
hard and disputed empirical question whether increased financial
industry concentration increases or decreases the stability of the industry.
As to politics, it is not clear that a less concentrated industrial structure
would actually have less political power. Smaller financial companies,
rooted in local communities, may well have more political legitimacy
and clout than huge elite Wall Street firms. Even Johnson & Kwak
recognize that in earlier days, coalitions of smaller banks dominated
Washington.242
It is thus unclear whether a hard, blanket ban on financial
companies above a certain size would on balance do more good than
harm. Moreover, any hard ban would provide a strong incentive to
creatively structure around limits. 24 3 In light of these uncertainties, it
probably makes sense to discourage too-big-to-fail entities in a variety of
ways without banning them outright. The Dodd-Frank Act follows that
strategy. At a variety of points it directs regulators to impose, or at least
to consider imposing, stricter regulatory limits on larger companies. 24 4 it
limits the ability of financial companies above a certain size to merge.245
It mandates a study on the effects of the size and complexity of financial
companies on capital markets,246 which could lead to further regulations
if the rules that flow from the Act do not do enough. These responses to
the too-big- to-fail dilemma may be a bit on the timid side, but
240. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 6-13.
243. RAJAN, supra note 7, at 171-72.
244. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1852, 5325, 5331 (2010).
245. Id. § 1852(b).
246. Id. § 5333.
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remember, Clers treat cowardice as a virtue.24 7 More may need to be
done in the future, but let us see how these measures work for now. We
can always do more if the next crisis suggests that more is necessary.
4. Glass-Steagall
The New Deal's Glass-Steagall Act separated investment and
commercial banks. 24 8 The wall between the two began to crumble in the
seventies, and fell completely in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act. 24 9 A number of commentators have suggested rebuilding this
wall. 25 0 The Dodd-Frank Act does not do so; the closest the Act comes is
a ban on some forms of proprietary trading by investment banks.251
I find the tie between the elimination of the Glass-Steagall Act and
the financial crisis rather murky and hard to determine. The same is true
for the need of the Glass-Steagall Act in the first place based on the
events of the Great Depression. To some extent this is a repeat of the
argument over too-big-to-fail, as the end of the Glass-Steagall Act did
aid the growth of huge financial conglomerates. But it also allowed
those conglomerates to diversify, which should have worked to decrease
rather than increase risk. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act did allow
the financial giants to engage in underwriting, buying, and selling
mortgage-backed securities while continuing to own commercial banks
as well. But even if the Glass-Steagall Act had not been repealed, huge
non-bank financial companies would still have engaged in those
activities, only not while owning commercial banks. It is not clear what
serious harm came from allowing investment and commercial banks to
combine. Insofar as this was a problem, the ban on proprietary trading
partially addresses it, though there are large holes in that ban. The fact
that the Glass-Steagall Act was a key part of our system for decades of
stability and that the crisis occurred not long after its repeal in 1999 does
argue in favor of resurrecting that Act. But the repeal was not actually
247. Rajan argues for a similar measured response to the too big to fail problem.
RAJAN, supra note 7, at 169-76. Perhaps one could do somewhat more while still not
banning all financial companies above a set size. For a few ideas not yet heeded, see
Arthur E. Wilmath, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-
Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011). The best idea, also stressed heavily in
ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 7, at 121-42, is a liquidation reserve funded by risk-based
premia. The risk-based prernia, if measured relatively well, would force companies to
internalize the risk they impose on the system.
248. Glass-Steadall Act, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
249. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. 106-102 113 Stat.
1338 (1999).
250. RouBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 210.
251. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1851
(2010).
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sudden-it was phased in over decades, beginning in the seventies. In
the end, the cowardice towards the Glass-Steagall Act seems justified, if
for no other reason than the fact that, given how much the Dodd-Frank
Act already contains, we should be wary of adding more.
5. Regulatory Agency Reorganization
In recent years, both the Treasury Department 252 and other parties253
proffered a variety of grand plans to consolidate American financial
regulatory agencies. Our regulatory system is quite complicated, with
dozens of agencies at the federal level and much regulation done at the
state level. Critics of this system suggest not only that it is confusing,
but also that it allows companies to search for the most lenient
regulators.2 54
The Dodd-Frank Act does very little on this front. The Act does
eliminate the Office of Thrift Supervision, 255 which had a bad reputation
and little political capital, but it also created a major new agency, the
Bureau for Consumer Financial Protection.256 Rather than consolidate
agencies, it created the Financial Stability Oversight Council to improve
coordination between agencies.257 That is not a major change, but I
suspect that is for the best. Major consolidations of federal agencies
threaten to create a new layer of bureaucracy without actually bringing
the underlying agencies closer together.2 58 There is already a lot going
on within the Dodd-Frank Act, creating serious uncertainty. There is
little point in creating even. more uncertainty with bureaucratic
reshuffling.
That said, one place where more reshuffling may have been in order
is merging the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The differences
between their subject areas are merely historical; in essence, both
252. Press Release, Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial
Regulatory Structure (March 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
253. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REP. ON REGULATORY REFORM (Jan. 29,
2009); GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
(Jan. 2009).
254. ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 216.
255. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5413.
256. Id. at § 5301. It is not clear if the bad reputation of OTS was really earned. See
Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office Thrift
Supervision's Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777 (2011).
257. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5321, 5322(a)(2). Recall that the FSOC is not a new agency, but rather a coordinating
body composed of the heads of the major financial regulatory agencies.
258. Can you say Department of Homeland Security?
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agencies regulate securities trading. There is really no reason for both
agencies to exist aside from turf wars both between the agencies and
their congressional committee overseers. 25 9 In the Dodd-Frank Act, the
resulting awkwardness shows in the regulation of swap markets. Parallel
structures and rules are created for securities-based swap markets,
regulated by the SEC, 2 60 and regular swap markets, regulated by the
CFTC.26 1 At best, this dual machinery is cumbersome and unnecessary;
at worst, it will lead to regulatory arbitrage as market participants look
262for the less strict regulator. The agencies are supposed to coordinate,
but that may not work as well as one would hope.
In short, the Dodd-Frank Act is perhaps even more cowardly than
optimal on agency reorganization, but on the whole its cowardice on this
front is warranted.263
6. International Cooperation
There are a few desultory calls for agency consultation with
agencies from other countries in the Dodd-Frank Act.2 64  Yet on the
whole the Act says little and does less about the international dimension
of financial regulation. That is an important hole. As capital flows
quickly around the world, even the best of national regulatory regimes
risks failure if markets simply avoid that regulation by moving to other
countries with lighter rules. Thus, some international cooperation is
essential. The Basel process whereby major national bank regulators
agree on a basic framework for capital requirement rules is by far the
most important example of such regulation to date. Work is well-
advanced on Basel III, which so far seems to be a real advance over
Basel II. Basel II went too far in relying on banks' own internal risk
models.26 5 The Basel III rules set minimum standards that are more
vanilla and should be harder for banks to avoid. They should thus play a
259. ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 202-03.
260. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203 §§ 761-74, 124 Stat. 1376, 1754-1802 (2010).
261. Id. §§ 721-54.
262. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 8302(a) (2010).
263. For a pre-Dodd-Frank article that similarly cautions against overly sweeping
reorganization and in favor of incremental adjustments, see Lawrence A. Cunningham &
David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary
Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 39 (2009).
264. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203 §§ 175, 217, 752, 929Y (2010).
265. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REv. 127
(2009).
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helpful role in limiting undue leverage. They even make some attempt at
encouraging counter-cyclical requirements.266 However, Basel III may
not go far enough-its capital requirements are probably too low, and its
risk weighting of assets still probably allows for too much gaming. A
letter from some of the leading finance economists in the world makes
that case.267 But it is an improvement, and going a lot further given
lobbying by bankers and the difficulties of international negotiations
would have been difficult.
Basel is probably not enough for international cooperation,
however, and for the same reason that our domestic banking regulations
are not enough: the banking rules do not address the shadow banking
world. How should international cooperation address shadow banking?
I have little clue-after all, even the best domestic approach is far from
clear, and the international picture is more complicated still. Regulators
are also going to have to cooperate more in devising a resolution process
for multinational financial companies.
Still, I am not convinced that more international cooperation is
necessarily a good thing. Such cooperation comes with a dark side. It
makes the global financial system more uniform, which means that if
something goes wrong, it is more likely to hit each country in the same
way at the same time, which is largely what happened in the recent
crisis. 2 68 Thank goodness, some major countries operated differently,
including China, whose very different financial and economic system
weathered the crisis better than Western economies.269 There is a lot to
be said for having a more diverse set of financial systems, such that if
some collapse others keep going, and so that we have more
experimentation and learning over time.270 It is, however, hard to know
how to have such diversity while still allowing free international capital
flows. A move towards more diverse systems would probably need to be
accompanied by some limits on cross-border capital flows.
266. Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Group of Governors
and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards (Sept.
12, 2010), available at http://bis.org/press/pl00912. htm.
267. Anat Admati et. al., Letter to the Editor, Healthy Banking System is the Goal,
Not Profitable Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, available at
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/admatiopen.html.
268. See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 323
(2011).
269. So far, at least. There's still time for a Chinese collapse. Chinese banks and real
estate markets have some serious problems. A Chinese collapse in the world's current
fragile state would be terribly exciting. We seem doomed to live in exciting times.
270. Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance-Possible, But Not
Desirable, 47 VILL. L. REv. 341 (2002).
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E. The Act on Balance
The previous section discussed the biggest alleged holes in the
Dodd-Frank Act: areas where there was serious support for more action
than Congress was willing to take. For some of these areas, more action
indeed seems justified-the Act is even a bit more cowardly than Clers
would prefer. But in other areas, the failure to act was prudent. On
balance, the Act takes action in a number of ways that appear to be
useful and well aimed at real problems revealed in the crisis, and it does
not have a lot of glaring holes (with the possible severe exception of the
shadow banking world, depending upon how rulemaking evolves). My
early assessment is that the Dodd-Frank Act is a rather exemplary
exercise in the applied philosophy of cowardly intervention.
And yet, a voice within me does call out that the crisis has
suggested future disasters looming, and that the Act is far from bold
enough to turn us off a path leading to those disasters. I ponder this
voice in the Conclusion.
VII. CONCLUSION
This crisis has been serious, and the resulting recession will be deep
and long. But we seem to have averted a true disaster.2 7' It could have
been worse. The initial shocks to the system in 2007-08 were arguably
as severe as those of 1929-30. This could have become the Second Great
Depression. The series of bailouts, the discretionary stimulus, and the
automatic stabilizers put in place by a federal government that is much
bigger and more pervasive than that of the Hoover era all helped stave
off a much worse crisis.
And yet, many of the factors that led to the crisis still exist. The
shadow banking system remains in place, and the Dodd-Frank Act does
not fully address it. The financial industry remains hugely powerful,
albeit politically unpopular for the moment. Financial industry
participants still receive huge bonuses, luring much talent into this
industry that could probably be more socially productive elsewhere and
giving that talent incentive to take high risks and invent new and more
complicated products. Our financial system remains incredibly complex,
tightly coupled, and rapidly evolving. And the bailouts needed to stop
the collapse have made the moral hazard problem far worse than it was
before.
Even more fundamental economic problems may lie behind these
remaining risks. The global economy is unbalanced. Emerging
countries like China save huge amounts of money and have invested that
271. At least as of the time of this writing. But it's not over yet.
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money in the world's most advanced economy, that of the U.S. This
huge influx of capital into the U.S. played a major role in driving up the
asset bubbles, first internet companies and then the housing market.272
More debatably, rising inequality in the U.S. may have led policymakers
to encourage a financial system that provides easy credit, diverting the
pain of stagnant incomes for middle class families. But this diversion of
pain is unsustainable in the long run.273 The U.S. financial system and
economy are becoming ever more unstable and unbalanced. The Dodd-
Frank Act applies some band-aids, but it does not cure what ails us.
Perhaps the uncertainty that I have emphasized combined with some
possibility of a truly catastrophic and irreversible 2 74 financial crisis
suggests that we should invoke the precautionary principle,275 which
would dictate much stricter regulations than I advocate or than the Dodd-
Frank Act requires. There is much debate over whether the
precautionary principle is ever justified, and if so, under what
circumstances. It seems to me that one necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for a plausible justification is that there is some realistic (if
perhaps not quantifiable) chance of a truly irreversible catastrophic
outcome in the absence of regulation. 27 6 In the area of environmental
regulation, the main home of the precautionary principle, catastrophe
predictions commonly invoke the end of civilization as we know it.
Is such a catastrophe a possible outcome of inadequate financial
regulation? It may help to distinguish black swans from white swans in
this area.277 Roubini and Mihm point out that financial crises are not rare
and hard to predict. They are in fact quite common, occurring regularly
in all advanced economies over the last several centuries.278 Roubini and
Mihm thus argue that financial crises are white swans, not the rare events
that Taleb popularized as black swans.279 These garden-variety financial
crises, including the one we are now living through, are not the kind of
catastrophe that may justify invoking the precautionary principle. They
are painful, but few people die, and after some time economies do
recover and progress go on. Economic capacity may never fully get back
272. RoUBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 127.
273. RAJAN, supra note 7, at 21-45.
274. On the importance of irreversibility, see Yair Listokin, Learning through Policy
Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 (2008).
275. See David Dana, The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35
QUEEN's L.J. 67 (2009); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. LJ. 901 (2011); Katie
Steele, The Precautionary Principle: A New Approach to Public Decision-Making?, 5 L.
PROB. & RISK 19 (2006).
276. See Listokin, supra note 274.
277. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2007).
278. See REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 17.
279. RouBINI & MIHM, supra note 7, at 14-15.
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to where it would have been in the absence of the crisis, but that is no
catastrophe.
One great financial crisis looks worse than the typical white swan
event: the Great Depression. The Great Depression included an
unprecedented decline, lasted many years, was worldwide in scope, and
seemed to bring society to the brink of a true catastrophe. Indeed, to the
extent that the Depression led to Hitler, the growth of communism, and
World War II, the consequences were awful. Yet the world did recover.
Some countries left the capitalist system and democracy, but they
returned. 28 0 Even this was not quite the sort of catastrophe that would
justify invoking the precautionary principle. Call it a grey swan.
But it was this grey swan that gave society a glimpse of a possible
black swan financial crisis. Imagine a Great Depression without leaders
of the caliber of Roosevelt and Churchill (and Keynes). The U.S. and the
U.K. either succumb to totalitarian politics internally (fascism or
communism), or else they lose the war and totalitarian regimes reign.
Orwell's vision triumphs.28 1 That is a financial crisis black swan that
would truly herald the end of market-based, democratic civilization as
we know it. If there is some sort of realistic possibility for such an event,
perhaps that justifies more urgent measures than the Dodd-Frank Act.
Is such a doomsday outcome possible enough to plausibly invoke
the precautionary principle in this realm of regulation? It is debatable,
but I suspect the answer is yes.282 I do not find it necessary to further
address this question, however, because even if a black swan scenario is
plausible, I do not think that, as of now, there is sufficient justification
for enhanced regulation beyond the Dodd-Frank Act.
Why not? Because greatly enhanced regulation carries with it its
own doomsday scenario. Hayek has already sketched out the basic path
in The Road to Serfdom. His story needs updating to make it truly
plausible for the contemporary world; elements of his story seem quite
dated-the sorts of socialist planning which were his primary target seem
quaint and obsolete. 283 But still, I think one can sketch a plausible story
leading from well-meaning attempts at extensive new regulation today to
ever-growing regulation needed to stop attempts to get around prior
regulation. Regulators need to keep pushing forward in order to maintain
past regulatory growth. To succeed, they need to quash political
280. Cuba and North Korea: still waiting. China: on a return trip.
281. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
282. That is, after all, the pessimist's answer.
283. Outside of Cuba and North Korea.
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opposition. The basic logic of The Road to Serfdom remains, even if
many of the details are changed.284
Indeed, many Americans believe we are heading down that road
under the Obama Administration.2 85 I find that rhetoric incredibly and
rather dangerously overblown, and indeed I have here defended one of
the President's main regulatory initiatives. But my point does not need
to be as alarmist as that of the Tea Partiers. I do not need to show that
there is right now a strong possibility that we are heading down the road
to serfdom. All I need to do is suggest that there is a non-trivial
possibility that strong regulation could eventually send us in that
direction. That possibility counter-balances the potential catastrophe that
could occur should we regulate too lightly.2 86
Given that anything we might do could turn out to produce
catastrophe, the chance of such disaster cannot really guide us unless we
have good reason to believe that one path substantially reduces the risk
of catastrophe relative to other paths. I do not believe we have good
reason to believe that right now when it comes to the possibility of
calamity through financial crisis.287 Moreover, even if there were good
reason to believe that one path is safer, and that path involved much
more restrictive regulation than I advocate here, for now such regulation
does not appear politically feasible. Perhaps if enough people become
adequately aware of looming catastrophe, more severe regulation will
become feasible.
284. A similar argument could be made within the home of the precautionary
principle itself, environmental regulation. Perhaps someone should write an article called
"The Road to Eco-Serfdom."
285. Those Americans have made The Road to Serfdom the leading economics book
on Amazon.com. [Editor's Note: As of August 14, 2011, The Road to Serfdom is ranked
number 13 on the list of Bestsellers in Economics, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/258 1/ref-zg bs nav b 2_53.]
286. My logic here resembles some of my favorite counter-arguments to Pascal's
wager. The wager, you will remember, is that we should choose to believe in God rather
than not because the payoff to believing should God in fact exist is infinitely positive
(heaven) while the payoff to not believing is infinitely negative (hell). Should God not
exist, the payoffs are finite, and thus dwarfed by the infinite payoffs should God exist so
long as there is any possibility (however small) that God does exist. PASCAL, PENStES
(1669). But, what if one chooses to believe in the wrong God, and the true God consigns
infidels to an even worse hell? I DENIS DIDEROT,. PENSEES PHILOSOPHIQUES 167 (1746)
(Fr.). Maybe there is an omnipotent Demon which will punish us with infinite pain for
believing in a good God. Edward Stein, God, the Demon, and the Status of Theodicies,
27 AM. PHIL. Q. 163 (1990). We may suffer infinite harm either way; the mere size of the
consequences if things turn out badly is not enough to determine our choice.
287. That is not to say that all options are equal in their likely effects on more
predictable crises. I have argued at length that cowardly interventions are best for that
purpose. Rather, I claim here that the options before us are roughly similar in terms of
their inability to ward off a financial Armageddon.
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If we are indeed on the path to disaster unless we drastically reform
and tame our financial system, perhaps what it will take to convince us to
move off that path is a grey swan like the Great Depression. A mere
white swan like the crisis we have just experienced is not enough. If that
is our path, let us hope then that we happen upon a grey swan before a
black one.
But let me (uncharacteristically) pull back from this complete
pessimism and return to the more qualified pessimism that characterizes
most of this paper. For now, there is not much we can or should do to
guard against true civilization-threatening disaster. What we can and
should do is try to delay the onset of the next financial crisis, improve
our ability to quickly address the crisis when it does arrive, and do those
things without going too far to restrict the dynamic financial markets
which are at the center of what is, after all, the most successful economy
in history. Even accomplishing these much more modest tasks imposes
incredibly hard difficulties given the rapidly evolving complexity of our
financial system and the great uncertainty inherent in our limited
understanding of that system.
We have looked to three wise guides for guidelines as to how to
regulate in the face of such deep uncertainty. They have provided
insights, but contradictory directions. An approach of cowardly
interventions in the face of financial crisis seems to best integrate their
contradictory insights. The Dodd-Frank Act, while imperfect even under
this philosophy that emphasizes inevitable imperfection, on balance does
pretty well under the circumstances.
Which leads to one last alternative titling attempt.
Final Alternative Title: Long-Run: Possibly Doomed; Short-Run:
Yuck; Medium-Run: Maybe Not So Bad.
Or more simply, and I promise my last alternative title: Alternative
Final Alternative Title: Panic?
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